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Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to
Frozen Embryo Disputes
Carl H. Colemant
INTRODUCTION
The first pregnancy resulting from the implantation of an
embryo' that had previously been frozen was reported in Aus-
tralia in 1983.2 Since then, the freezing, or cryopreservation, of
embryos created through in vitro fertilization (IVF) has become
t Executive Director, New York State Task Force on Life and the Law;
Adjunct Professor, New York University School of Law. B.S.F.S., Georgetown
University; A.M., J.D., Harvard University. Work on this Article was sup-
ported in part by a generous grant from the Ford Foundation, New York, New
York, Grant #980-1709. Except where otherwise noted, the views expressed in
this Article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law. For helpful comments on previ-
ous versions of this Article, I am grateful to Aytan Y. Bellin, Kathleen M. Boo-
zang, Martin A. Coleman, Alan R. Fleischman, Samuel Gorovitz, Jane Green-
law, Dana H.C. Lee, and Tracy E. Miller. I also would like to thank Jennifer
S. Geetter and Cara L. Herrick for excellent research assistance.
1. Some commentators use the term "pre-embryo," rather than "embryo,"
to describe the entities that are the subject of this Article. The term "pre-
embryo" refers to "that period of development from the end of the process of
fertilization until the appearance of a single primitive streak," a period that
lasts approximately fourteen days. Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Charlotte
Schrader, And Just What Is a Pre-Embryo?, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 189,
190 (1989). Those who use the term "pre-embryo" emphasize that, during the
first fourteen days of development, "the fate of the product of the fertilized egg
is very much in doubt, with many possible alternative outcomes," id. at 189,
and that "it is the exception rather than the rule that a single biologic individ-
ual will result." Id. at 190. Other commentators, however, criticize the use of
the term "pre-embryo" "'as an exercise of linguistic engineering to make hu-
man embryo research more palatable to the general public.'" Richard A.
McCormick, Who or What Is the Preembryo?, KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 1
(1991) (quoting Michael Jarmulowicz, Letters: Ethics, Science and Embryos,
THE TABLET, Feb. 10, 1990, at 181).
2. See Alan Trounson & Linda Mohr, Human Pregnancy Following Cryo-
preservation, Thawing and Transfer of an Eight-Cell Embryo, 305 NATURE
707, 709 (1983).
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a standard part of the practice of assisted reproductive tech-
nologies (ARTs).3 According to recent estimates, frozen em-
bryos are now being accumulated at the rate of tens of thou-
sands per year in the United States alone.4
The long-term storage of frozen embryos can give rise to
complex legal dilemmas, particularly when the couple that cre-
ated the embryos disagrees about the embryos' fate. If the cou-
ple divorces, may one partner use the embryos to achieve a
pregnancy over the other partner's objection? Can one partner
insist on the destruction of the embryos regardless of the other
partner's views? Equally difficult questions can arise when one
or both members of the couple dies, disappears, or loses deci-
sion-making capacity.
Most states have not enacted legislation addressing these
issues,5 and there are few judicial decisions on point. However,
the statutes and cases that exist, as well as most of the aca-
demic and professional commentary in the area, largely sup-
port the same general approach. Specifically, they maintain
that disputes over the disposition of frozen embryos could be
avoided if couples signed contracts, at the time they create em-
bryos through IVF, specifying their instructions for the disposi-
tion of any excess frozen embryos in a variety of scenarios. 6
These contracts would be binding unless both parties agree to
modify their instructions at a later date. Proponents of this
approach argue that it would promote the procreative liberty of
the contracting parties and reduce burdens on practitioners,
patients, and the courts.7
This Article argues that the widespread support for a con-
tractual solution to questions surrounding the disposition of
frozen embryos is misguided. 8 Rather than promoting procrea-
3. ARTs refer to a variety of procedures used to treat infertility, includ-
ing assisted ovulation, assisted insemination, in vitro fertilization, gamete in-
trafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, assisted fertilization, and
assisted sperm retrieval. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE
LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 43-69 (1998) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE TASK
FORCE]. These procedures do not cure infertility but instead bypass it, allow-
ing the individual to achieve pregnancy in a specific treatment cycle. See id.
at 43.
4. See Gina Kolata, Medicine's Troubling Bonus: Surplus of Human Em-
bryos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, at Al.
5. But see infra Part II.A.2.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra notes 77-79, 80-94, 99-111 and accompanying text.
8. A few other commentators have raised concerns about the application
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tive liberty, requiring couples to make binding decisions about
the future disposition of their frozen embryos undermines a
central aspect of procreative freedom-the right to make con-
temporaneous decisions about how one's reproductive capacity
will be used. In addition, contracts for the disposition of frozen
embryos undermine important societal values about families,
reproduction, and the strength of genetic ties. While advance
agreements can play an important role when couples are un-
available to make disposition decisions, 9 such agreements
should not be applied if either partner objects to the application
of the agreement in a particular case.
Part I of this Article provides general background about
IVF and embryo cryopreservation and summarizes major per-
spectives on the moral status of the human embryo. Part II
summarizes the existing case law and commentary regarding
the disposition of frozen embryos, the majority of which sup-
ports a contractual approach to resolving disposition disputes.
Challenging that approach, the remainder of the article devel-
ops an alternative framework for resolving disputes about the
disposition of frozen embryos. Part III explains the starting
point for this framework-the principle that nothing should
happen to a frozen embryo without the mutual consent of the
couple that created it. Part IV argues that, although the con-
tractual approach appears to comply with the letter of the mu-
tual consent principle, it fails to adhere to its spirit. In place of
the contractual approach, Part IV argues, the law should pro-
tect both partners' interest in making contemporaneous repro-
ductive decisions by treating the right to control the disposition
of one's frozen embryos as an inalienable right-one that can-
of contract principles to decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos. See,
e.g., George J. Annas, The Shadowlands-Secrets, Lies, and Assisted Repro-
duction, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 935, 936-37 (1998) (noting "[tihe inadequacy of
contract analysis in this area"); Kimberly E. Diamond, Cryogenics, Frozen
Embryos and the Need for New Means of Regulation: Why the U.S. Is Frozen in
Its Current Approach, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 77, 94 (1998) ("[A]llowing contract
law to continue as the primary basis for U.S. courts' decisions in cryogenics
cases is not the best approach."); Alexander Morgan Capron, Parenthood and
Frozen Embryos: More Than Property and Privacy, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 32, 33 (criticizing "deference to prior agreements" as a
means of resolving frozen embryo disputes); Ellen H. Moskowitz, Some Things
Don't Belong in Contracts, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1998, at A25 ("While there is
merit in encouraging couples undergoing IVF to plan in advance how they
would handle future disputes over frozen embryos, these plans should not be
legally binding."). However, none of these articles addresses the issue of con-
tracts at length.
9. See infra Part V.A.
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not be relinquished irrevocably until a disposition decision ac-
tually is carried out. Part V explains how an inalienable right
to mutual consent would operate in practice. Finally, Part VI
responds to several objections that might be raised to the ap-
proach set forth herein.
I. BACKGROUND
A. IVF
Since the first child conceived through IVF was born in
1978,10 the use of IVF and related ARTs has grown considera-
bly. In 1996, nearly 65,000 ART treatment cycles were carried
out at 300 programs in the United States." The vast majority
of these cycles involved IVF, a process in which fertilization oc-
curs "in vitro"-in a laboratory dish-rather than inside the
woman's body. 12
The process of IVF typically begins with the administration
of ovulation-stimulating hormones to the woman. 13 These
drugs are designed to induce multiple egg-containing follicles to
mature, so that numerous eggs-up to several dozen-can be
obtained in a single treatment cycle. 14 Just prior to ovulation,
the eggs are removed from the woman in a minor surgical pro-
10. The first baby born through IVF was Louise Brown. See generally
LESLEY BROWN & JOHN BROWN, OUR MIRACLE CALLED LOUISE: A PARENT'S
STORY (1979).
11. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION ET AL., 1996
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 1, 6 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL]. 1996 is the most recent year for which
national data about IVF and other ARTs are available.
12. See id. The other procedures included in this statistic were gamete
intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) and zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT). See
id.
13. In "natural cycle" IVF, ovulation-stimulating hormones are not used.
See infra notes 29-30.
14. See GEOFFREY SHER ET AL., IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: THE A.R.T. OF
MAKING BABIES 49 (1995). To stimulate the ovaries, the woman generally re-
ceives injections of pituitary gonadotropins once or twice a day from early in
the menstrual cycle until the day prior to egg retrieval. See id. at 54. Use of
these drugs entails certain immediate and long-term risks, including possible
allergic reactions, abdominal distension and pain, abnormal blood clotting,
fluid in the abdomen or lungs, liver damage, kidney failure, stroke, life-
threatening respiratory distress, or debilitating or fatal blood clots. See NEW
YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 47-48. In addition, concerns have
been raised about a possible link between pituitary gonadotropins and ovarian
cancer. See, e.g., Robert Spirtas et al., Fertility Drugs and Ovarian Cancer:
Red Alert or Red Herring?, 59 FERTILITY & STERILITY 291, 291 (1993).
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cedure.15 Then, sperm that has been obtained from the
woman's male partner or a donor is introduced into individual
culture dishes, each of which contains a culture medium and
one egg. If fertilization occurs, the resulting embryos are al-
lowed to mature in the culture medium for several days, after
which some or all of them are transferred into the woman's
uterus so that implantation can occur. 16
Success rates of IVF vary considerably, depending on fac-
tors such as patient age, diagnosis, length of infertility, the
number of previous ART attempts, and the skill and experience
of the practitioners.' 7 In 1996, the average live birth rate per
ovarian stimulation procedure at IVF programs nationwide was
25.9 percent.' 8
B. EMBRYO CRYOPRESERVATION
Because of the large number of eggs produced through
hormonal stimulation and then fertilized, lVF frequently leads
to the creation of more embryos than can safely be transferred
15. In most cases, eggs are removed through ultrasound-guided trans-
vaginal aspiration. Serious complications from the procedure are rare, al-
though one death has been reported. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, su-
pra note 3, at 55. One in 1,000 patients undergoing the procedure will require
major surgery to stop bleeding or repair organ damage. See id.
16. See generally id. at 56-59. Usually, the embryos are transferred into
the uterus of the woman who provided the eggs. In some situations, however,
a woman will undergo ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval to produce eggs
for donation to another woman. See generally Mark V. Sauer, Oocyte Dona-
tion: Reviewing a Decade of Growth and Development, 13 SEMINARS IN
REPROD. ENDOCRINOLOGY 79, 79-80 (1995) (tracing the development of oocyte
and embryo donation). In other cases, a woman who is unable to carry a preg-
nancy to term may have her eggs retrieved, fertilized, and then transferred to
the uterus of a "gestational surrogate'--a woman who agrees to gestate the
embryo and then relinquish the resulting child to the genetic mother after
birth. See generally Paulo Serafini et al., In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy, 4
ASSISTED REPROD. REV. 155 (1994) (discussing the process of gestational sur-
rogacy). Both egg donation and gestational surrogacy result in a child with
two biological mothers-one woman who provided the egg used to conceive the
child (the "genetic mother"), and another who gestated the child and gave
birth (the "birth mother" or the "gestational mother"). NEW YORK STATE TASK
FORCE, supra note 3, at 334-40.
17. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 11, at 12; John Wa-
terstone et al., Embryo Transfer to Low Uterine Cavity, 337 LANCET 1413,
1413 (1991) (finding substantial differences in pregnancy rates between two
practitioners practicing at the same program).
18. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 11, at 12. The aver-
age live birth rate ranged from approximately 35 percent for women in their
twenties to less than 5 percent for women in their forties. See id. at 15.
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into the uterus at one time. 19 The ability to freeze embryos al-
lows practitioners to store any embryos that cannot be trans-
ferred immediately for possible use at a later date. Embryos
are frozen by replacing the cells' watery interior with a cryopro-
tectant solution, loading the embryos into straws that contain
tiny amounts of fluid, and then freezing the straws using com-
puter-controlled machines. The straws are stored in canisters
kept frozen with liquid nitrogen.20
When cryopreservation first was introduced, many em-
bryos were not viable after thawing.21 The technology has im-
proved, however, and some practitioners estimate that embryos
can be stored safely for as long as fifty years.22 However, preg-
nancy rates following the transfer of cryopreserved embryos are
lower than those of cycles using fresh embryos. 23
The availability of embryo cryopreservation offers several
potential benefits to IVF patients. First, cryopreservation can
reduce the number of times a woman must undergo ovarian
stimulation and egg retrieval. If the woman does not become
pregnant in her first IVF cycle (or if she wants to attempt an-
19. Determining an appropriate number of embryos to transfer per cycle
has been the subject of considerable debate. To a certain point, transferring
more embryos increases the likelihood of pregnancy, but it also increases the
chance of multiple gestation, which entails significant risks for the woman and
any children who result. See Maria Bustillo, Imposing Limits on the Number
of Oocytes and Embryos Transferred. Is It Necessary/Wise or Naughty/Nice?,
12 HUM. REPROD. 1616, 1616-17 (1997). In the United States, practitioners
routinely transfer four or more embryos in an IVF cycle. See Frangois Oliven-
nes & Ren6 Frydman, The AR.T. of Embroidery, 11 HUM. REPROD. 699, 700
(1996). Other countries have laws that limit the number of embryos that may
be transferred per cycle, most commonly to three. See Howard W. Jones, The
Time Has Come, 65 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1090, 1090-91 (1996). While some
commentators have urged the adoption of such laws in the United States, see
generally ISLAT Working Group, A.R.T. into Science: Regulation of Fertility
Techniques, 281 SCIENCE 651, 651 (1998) (calling for federal legislation), oth-
ers claim that limits on the number of embryos transferred per cycle would
unconstitutionally limit patients' procreative liberty by reducing the efficacy of
IVF. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 206-07 (1994).
20. See generally NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 81-84.
21. See Etienne Van den Abbeel et al., Viability of Partially Damaged
Human Embryos After Cryopreservation, 12 HUM. REPROD. 2006, 2006 (1997).
22. See R.G. Edwards & Helen K. Beard, Destruction of Cryopreserved
Embryos: UK Law Dictated the Destruction of 3000 Cryopreserved Human
Embryos, 12 HUM. REPROD. 3, 3 (1997).
23. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 11, at 21. In 1996,
the average live birth rate per transfer in cycles using frozen embryos was
16.6 percent, compared to 27.9 percent for cycles using fresh embryos. See id.
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other pregnancy), she can undergo a second cycle using frozen
embryos, which substantially reduces the time, inconvenience,
medical risks, and costs of the procedure. 24
Second, cryopreservation allows women to preserve their
ability to have genetically-related children even after they lose
the ability to produce eggs. For example, a woman about to
undergo chemotherapy can undergo IVF and freeze the result-
ing embryos to use after successful cancer treatment.25 Some
women approaching middle age may choose to create and freeze
embryos because of concerns about age-related declines in fer-
tility.26
Third, by making it possible to preserve any embryos not
used immediately, the availability of cryopreservation makes it
possible for persons morally opposed to the destruction of hu-
man embryos 27 to undergo ovarian stimulation and IVF with
the knowledge that multiple embryos might result. If, by con-
24. See supra note 14.
25. Although researchers have reported some success in freezing unfer-
tilized eggs, see Eleonora Porcu et al., Birth of a Healthy Female After Intracy-
toplasmic Sperm Injection of Cryopreserved Human Oocytes, 68 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 724, 725 (1997), the cryopreservation of eggs is still not part of
standard clinical practice. Therefore, women who wish to freeze their eggs
must fertilize them first, either with sperm from their partners or, if they do
not have a partner, with donor sperm. As an alternative for women who wish
to preserve their future reproductive options, some IVF programs will remove
and freeze portions of a woman's ovary for possible re-implantation at a later
date. See Gina Kolata, Surgery Preserves Parts of an Ovary for Reimplanting,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at Al. The first successful re-implantation of fro-
zen ovarian tissue was reported in September 1999. See Denise Grady, Baler-
ina's Ovarian Tissue Transplant Gives Hope to Other Young Women Facing
Infertility, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at A9. However, some programs have
actively marketed ovarian cryopreservation as accepted medical treatment for
years, a practice that has raised ethical concerns. See, e.g., The National Ad-
visory Board on Ethics in Reproduction, NABER Identifies Ethical Issues
Raised by the Marketing of Two New Cryopreservation Techniques, 2 NABER
REP. 1, 1-2 (1996).
26. Women's fertility begins to decline gradually after age 30, with a
steeper decline between ages 35 and 40 and a near loss of reproductive poten-
tial by the mid- to late-forties. See Daniel Navot et al., Age-Related Decline in
Female Fertility Is Not Due to Diminished Capacity of the Uterus to Sustain
Embryo Implantation, 61 FERTILITY & STERILITY 97, 97 (1994). Even after
menopause, however, women are able to gestate an embryo created with an
egg from a younger woman. See id. at 100; Mark V. Sauer et al., Pregnancy in
Women 50 or More Years of Age: Outcomes of 22 Consecutively Established
Pregnancies from Oocyte Donation, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 111, 113 (1997)
(finding that implantation rates with donor eggs are as high in women over 50
as in younger women).
27. See infra Part I.D.
1999]
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trast, any embryos not used immediately had to be discarded,28
persons opposed to the destruction of human embryos would
probably be unwilling to create multiple embryos. Although
they might be willing to use "natural cycle" IVF, in which only
those eggs that mature naturally in any given month are re-
trieved and fertilized,29 the likelihood of becoming pregnant
through natural cycle IVF is extremely low.30 Cryopreservation
therefore expands the reproductive options of persons who be-
lieve that the disposal of human embryos is immoral.
Fourth, the ability to preserve any untransferred embryos
decreases the incentive to transfer high numbers of embryos in
the initial IVF cycle, thereby reducing the likelihood that a
multiple gestation will occur. Multiple gestations, particularly
high-order multiple gestations such as triplets or greater, cre-
ate significant risks for the woman, the developing fetuses, and
any children who result, including a substantially greater
chance of death during the first year of life.31 Moreover, when
high-order multiple gestations occur, patients often are asked
to consider fetal reduction-a procedure in which one or more
fetuses are destroyed so the remaining ones have a better
28. Theoretically, it would be possible for persons opposed to the destruc-
tion of embryos to donate excess embryos to other patients, but the demand for
donor embryos is relatively low. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
Moreover, without the ability to freeze embryos, donation could take place
only if a recipient were available to use the embryos immediately.
29. Natural cycle, or unstimulated, IVF is performed without using most
ovulation-stimulating drugs. Instead, practitioners monitor the woman's
natural cycle and, at the appropriate time, remove any eggs that have ma-
tured. See generally Una M. Fahy et al., In-Vitro Fertilization in Completely
Natural Cycles, 10 HUM. REPROD. 572, 574-75 (1995) (concluding that natural
cycle IVF can be effective).
30. Natural cycle IVF has a lower success rate than cycles in which ovar-
ian-stimulating drugs are used because fewer eggs are produced and the clini-
cian cannot control the timing of ovulation. Of 26,961 IVF cycles initiated in
1994 (the latest year for which data on natural cycle IVF are available), 410
did not involve ovarian stimulation. Only 16 of these cycles resulted in deliv-
eries. See Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology & the American Soci-
ety for Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United
States and Canada: 1994 Results Generated from the American Society for Re-
productive Medicine/Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry, 66
FERTILITY & STERILITY 697, 698 (1996).
31. One in ten infants from multiple gestations dies before reaching
twelve months of age, and survivors are far more likely than singletons to suf-
fer complications leading to lifelong disability. See Joyce A. Martin et al.,
Triplet Births: Trends and Outcomes, 1971-1994, in VITAL HEALTH
STATISTICS, at 1, 10 (National Ctr. for Health Statistics Series 21, No. 55,
1997).
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chance-a decision that is agonizing for most patients and
morally unacceptable for some.32 However, the impact of cryo-
preservation on the number of embryos transferred remains
unclear, and national data indicate that the rate of IVF-
generated multiple births has not gone down since cryopreser-
vation became widely available.33
Finally, cryopreservation offers increased options for
women at risk of developing certain medical complications as-
sociated with ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval. For exam-
ple, in some cases, hormones used to stimulate ovulation can
lead to ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS), a condition
in which the ovaries become swollen and painfully filled with
cysts. 34 Because pregnancy can aggravate the symptoms of
OHSS, patients deemed at risk of developing the condition may
be advised to freeze all of the embryos created following ovar-
ian stimulation and to use them to establish a pregnancy once
the risk of developing OHSS has passed.35
C. DISPOSITION OF CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS
In many cases, cryopreserved embryos will be used by the
couple that created them. If the couple is no longer willing or
able to use the embryos together, they have five options: allow
the embryos to be used by one or both of the partners, either
alone or with a new partner; donate the embryos to another pa-
tient; destroy the embryos; allow the embryos to be used in sci-
entific research (following which the embryos will be de-
stroyed);36 or keep the embryos in frozen storage indefinitely.
32. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 458-60 (minority
report) (arguing "that fetal reduction in ARTs be outlawed except in those in-
stances where the destruction of the unborn life is necessary to prevent the
death of the mother"); Mary McKinney et al., The Psychological Effects of Mul-
tifetal Pregnancy Reduction, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 51, 51-52 (1995).
33. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 151 (reporting
that the percentage of IVF deliveries that were multiple births has risen
steadily since 1987).
34. See Joseph G. Schenker, Prevention and Treatment of Ovarian Hyper-
stimulation, 8 HUI. REPROD. 653, 653 (1993).
35. See I. Wada et al., Does Elective Cryopreservation of All Embryos from
Women at Risk of Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome Reduce the Incidence
of the Condition?, 100 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 265, 269 (1993)
(finding that the severity, although not the incidence, of OHSS can be reduced
if women considered at risk of developing OHSS freeze all of their embryos for
transfer at a later date).
36. Research with excess embryos left over from infertility treatment is
generally "basic" or "nontherapeutic" research, meaning that it is not designed
1999]
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Some couples may agree that, if they are unable to use all
of their embryos together, either one or both of the partners
should have the right to use any remaining frozen embryos to
start a new family. According to some reports, some couples
decide that the partner with the predominant factor of infertil-
ity should have the right to use any excess embryos because
that person may find it difficult to reproduce in any other
way.37
Many cryopreservation programs offer the option of do-
nating excess frozen embryos to other infertility patients, but it
does not appear that this option is used frequently.38 In one
study, couples' interest in donating excess embryos declined
substantially once the implications of the procedure were made
clear-in particular, the fact that donation could result in the
birth of genetic siblings of the couple's existing children. 39
Moreover, the demand for donor embryos appears to be rela-
tively low.40 No state or federal law limits the use of embryo
donation, 41 although laws in some states require couples who
donate excess embryos to undergo screening for infectious
and/or genetic diseases.42
Destruction of unwanted embryos is another option at most
cryopreservation programs, although some practitioners are
unwilling to participate in the destruction of embryos they have
to benefit the particular embryos that are the subject of the research. Ac-
cording to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, basic embryo re-
search "involves [a] prior declaration that no resulting [embryos] will be trans-
ferred to the uterus, either because the [embryo] is not expected to survive the
experimental procedure or because there is obvious risk that abnormalities
may be caused by the study procedures." Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gies, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 78S, 78S (Supp. 1994).
37. Comments of practitioners, New York Academy of Medicine Sympo-
sium on Assisted Reproductive Technologies (June 16, 1998).
38. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 238-39.
39. Douglas M. Saunders et al., Frozen Embryos: Too Cold to Touch? The
Dilemma Ten Years On, 10 HUM. REPROD. 3081, 3081 (1995).
40. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 238-39.
41. However, when embryo donation was first introduced, some commen-
tators raised concerns that the procedure might run afoul of state laws pro-
hibiting embryo research, given that embryo donation was arguably an ex-
perimental procedure. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at
238; see also infra note 49.
42. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 245-54. In states
with these requirements, many embryos now in storage could not be used for
donation because the couples who created the embryos did not undergo the
necessary medical screening before the embryos were frozen. See id. at 254.
[Vol 84:55
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worked hard to create.43 Some programs comply with requests
to destroy unwanted embryos by transferring the embryos to
another facility, where the destruction is performed. 44 Two
states have enacted laws that limit the ability of programs to
destroy unwanted embryos. In Louisiana, the destruction of
frozen embryos is prohibited by statute.45 In Kentucky, public
medical facilities may be used for IVF or IVF research only if
"such procedures do not result in the intentional destruction of
a human embryo. '46
Some cryopreservation programs offer the option of donat-
ing excess embryos for scientific research. Embryo research is
conducted for a variety of purposes, including increasing un-
derstanding of early embryo development, improving infertility
treatment, diagnosing genetic abnormalities, and developing
contraceptives or treatments for cancer.47 Embryos also may be
used to produce "stem cells"--a kind of cell that has the poten-
tial to develop into many types of human tissues-which may
be used in research on human development or to develop drugs
and other treatments for a wide variety of diseases. 48 In four
states, statutes prohibit or significantly limit the use of em-
bryos in scientific research.49
The final disposition option-indefinite storage-can be ei-
ther an affirmative choice or the result of an unwillingness or
inability to decide. While some cryopreservation programs set
time limits on storage of human embryos, these limits are not
always strictly enforced.5 0 Moreover, couples who wish to pre-
43. See Kolata, supra note 4, at A32.
44. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 301.
45. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1998).
46. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Michie 1998).
47. See NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO
RESEARCH PANEL 2 (1994).
48. See Eliot Marshall, A Versatile Cell Line Raises Scientific Hopes, Legal
Questions, 282 SCIENCE 1014, 1014 (1998).
49. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 510/6(7) (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:122 (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1-7 (Michie 1998); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (West 1998). New Hampshire is the only state that
specifically permits embryo research, but it places some restrictions on the
way embryos are handled. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (1999). Fed-
eral funding is not available for research in which embryos will be destroyed
or discarded. See Pub. L. No. 105-78, § 513, 111 Stat. 1467, 1517 (1997).
However, the National Institutes of Health has taken the position that the ban
on federal funding of embryo research does not preclude federal funding of re-
search on stem cells derived from human embryos. See Eliot Marshall, Ruling
May Free NIH to Fund Stem Cell Studies, 283 SCIENCE 465, 465 (1999).
50. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra, note 3, at 306.
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serve their frozen embryos after the time limit has expired
have the option of transferring the embryos to another facil-
ity.51
D. THE MORAL STATUS OF HUMAN EMBRYOS
Commentators hold widely differing perspectives on the
moral status of the human embryo. Disputes over the disposi-
tion of frozen embryos often stem at least in part from these
different ethical views.
At one end of the spectrum is the view that human em-
bryos are persons from the moment of conception, a position
exemplified by the Vatican's 1987 Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity of Procreation.52
Those taking this position emphasize that a person's unique
genetic makeup is complete as soon as that person is conceived.
As the Vatican's Instruction states, "from the first instant, the
program is fixed as to what this living being will be: a man, this
individual man with his characteristic aspects already well de-
termined."53
Virtually all commentators who believe that embryos are
persons object to the intentional destruction of human embryos,
as well as to research on embryos that will result in the em-
bryos' destruction. 54 Indeed, many of those who regard em-
bryos as persons oppose any use of IVF, in large part because of
51. In York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 427 (E.D. Va. 1989), a federal dis-
trict court rejected an IVF program's efforts to deny a couple the right to
transfer their frozen embryo to another facility. See also Del Zio v. Columbia
Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450, at
*12-24 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (ordering IVF program to pay damages to a
couple for intentional infliction of emotional distress after destroying an em-
bryo rather than returning it to the couple).
52. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, 16 ORIGINS 697,
701 (1987).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 702-03; see also BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH:
THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 199 (1992) ("If em-
bryos are human persons, with the same right to life as any other person, then
discarding them or using them for research purposes because they are un-
wanted or defective is seriously wrong."). However, one Catholic ethicist has
concluded that thawing and discarding excess cryopreserved embryos can
demonstrate respect for the embryos' potential humanity by "accepting the in-
evitable, namely that these embryos have no future with regard to the devel-
opment of their potentiality and therefore should perish." P.R. Koninckx & P.
Schotsmans, Spare Embryos: Symbols of Respect for Humanity and Freezing
in the Pronuclear Stage, 11 HUM. REPROD. 1841, 1842 (1996).
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the risk that the resulting embryos will be destroyed or used in
scientific research.5 5 When couples who have undergone IVF
are left with frozen embryos they no longer wish to use, adher-
ents of the embryo-as-person perspective generally regard do-
nation to other patients as the most acceptable option because
it will give the embryos a chance to be born.5 6
At the other end of the spectrum is the position that em-
bryos have no special moral status but instead should be
viewed as the property of the couple that created them. This
perspective-which few commentators explicitly embrace 5 7-
would give the couple unfettered discretion over how their
frozen embryos are disposed.
Most commentators maintain that embryos are neither
persons nor property.58 Those who take this position generally
agree that embryos have a heightened moral status and that,
as a result, society should treat embryos with "special re-
spect."59 For example, in a 1994 statement, the American Fer-
55. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 105-14. In addi-
tion to concerns about the destruction of human embryos, the Catholic Church
maintains that, by separating reproduction from the conjugal act, IVF "de-
prives human procreation of the dignity which is proper and conatural to it."
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, supra note 52, at 707. Some
Catholic commentators, however, believe that IVF can be morally acceptable
for married couples using their own gametes. See, e.g., Richard A. McCormick,
Therapy or Tampering? The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, AMERICA, Dec.
7, 1985, at 396, 399.
56. Although the Catholic Church generally opposes the use of ARTs, a
Vatican ethicist endorsed the idea of "pre-natal adoption" as an alternative to
the planned destruction of excess embryos in the United Kingdom in 1996.
See Associated Press, Vatican Shift on Embryos: Eyes "Pre-Natal Adoption,"
DAILY NEWS, July 24, 1996, at 6.
57. But see ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING
POLICY FROM LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 40 (1989) ("Of all the things
that the embryo can be... the one that emerges in the daily administration of
IVF and cryopreservation is the legalistic notion of the embryo as property.");
Diamond, supra note 8, at 87 ("[Flor public policy reasons, designating frozen
embryos as pure property seems to be the best approach.").
58. Some commentators argue that although embryos are not themselves
"property," individuals have "property interests" in their embryos insofar as
they have the right to control how the embryos will be used. See, e.g., John
Dwight Ingram, In Vitro Fertilization: Problems and Solutions, 98 DICK. L.
REV. 67, 75-76 (1993); John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND.
L.J. 1027, 1038-39 (1994).
59. Most of these commentators regard the embryo's moral status as dif-
ferent from that of fetuses. Some emphasize that pre-implantation embryos
are at a much earlier stage of development than fetuses already in the womb
and that they clearly lack the capacity to experience pleasure or pain. See,
e.g., Samuel Gorovitz, Progeny, Progress, and Primrose Paths, in THE ETHICS
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tility Society (now known as the American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine) concluded that an embryo is not a person but
that it "is to be treated with special respect because it is a ge-
netically unique, living human entity that might become a per-
son."60 Others have argued that embryos are entitled to special
respect "because [they are] the result of procreative activity"61
or because they may constitute "a potent symbol of human
life."62
Commentators who believe that embryos are entitled to
special respect generally oppose actions that contribute to the
perception of embryos as commodities. For this reason, virtu-
ally all of these commentators oppose the purchase and sale of
embryos.63 Some also oppose the creation of embryos specifi-
cally for research purposes6 or the creation of embryos "on
OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 117, 122-23 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992)
(arguing that the "emergence" of personhood "begins to have moral force with
the onset of fetal sentience"). Other commentators distinguish embryos from
fetuses on the ground that embryos will not develop into children without sig-
nificant technological intervention. See STEINBOCK, supra note 54, at 200
("The fertilized egg in vitro cannot develop into a fetus 'all by itself.'").
60. Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 36, at
33S.
61. George J. Annas et al., The Politics of Human-Embryo Research-
Avoiding Ethical Gridlock, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1329, 1330 (1996).
62. STEINBOCK, supra note 54, at 196-97.
63. See, e.g., Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra
note 36, at 51S. Some states have laws prohibiting the purchase and sale of
embryos. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:122 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998). Federal law
lists specific body parts, including fetal tissue, that may not be sold. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 274e (1998). However, since federal regulations define a fetus as
the product of human conception from implantation until birth, see 45 C.F.R. §
46.203(c) (1998), an embryo that has not yet been implanted would not fall
within the definition of fetus or fetal tissue.
64. See, e.g., Annas et. al., supra note 61, at 1331 (arguing that "it is the
intention to create a child that makes the creation of an embryo a moral act"
and that creating "embryos solely for research.., seems to cheapen the act of
procreation and turn embryos into commodities"). But see STEINBOCK, supra
note 54, at 211 (arguing that, because embryos cannot be harmed or benefited,
"it is as permissible to create embryos with the intention of using them in
valuable scientific research as it is to create them with the intention of trans-
ferring them for implantation"). In a September 1994 report, the National In-
stitutes of Health Human Embryo Research Panel recommended that federal
funding should be available for the creation of embryos expressly for research
under two conditions: when the research cannot by its nature be conducted
otherwise, as with research on eggs prior to fertilization or on the process of
fertilization itself, and when a representative group of embryos is needed to
validate a study "of outstanding scientific and therapeutic value" and some of
those embryos are not available through donations. NATIONAL INSTS. OF
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speculation"-i.e., by fertilizing donor eggs with donor sperm
not for the treatment of specific patients but in order to create
an inventory of embryos to market to prospective patients in
the future.65
Most adherents of the "special respect" position, however,
do not oppose the destruction of unwanted embryos or the use
of embryos in at least some forms of scientific research.6 6 Some
commentators who support embryo research note that society
approves of research on other entities entitled to "special re-
spect," such as cadavers. 67 One commentator argues that
"symbolic value should not take precedence over the interests of
real people" and therefore should not preclude embryo research
that could lead to important medical advances. 68
In addition to differing views on the embryo's moral status,
other ethical and religious considerations may affect individu-
als' decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos. For ex-
ample, some religious authorities object to embryo donation (as
well as the donation of sperm and eggs) because of the potential
impact on the purity of blood lines within families.69 In some
religions, a particular concern with embryo donation is the risk
HEALTH, supra note 47, at xii. In response to the report, however, President
Clinton announced that he would not approve any federal funds for the crea-
tion of human embryos solely for research. See Warren E. Leary, Clinton
Rules Out Federal Money for Research on Human Embryos Created for That
Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at A8.
65. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 275 (recommend-
ing regulations prohibiting facilities from creating embryos by fertilizing donor
eggs with donor sperm except at the request of specific patients who intend to
use the embryos for their own treatment).
66. Many commentators who support embryo research believe that such
research should be limited to the first fourteen days of the embryo's develop-
ment. During that period, the embryo is not yet committed to forming a single
being, as it may still divide into twins or combine with other embryos to form a
single entity. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra
note 36, at 29S-30S. Fourteen days also is the point at which embryos gener-
ally implant in the uterine wall and when the "primitive streak," the precursor
of the nervous system, first appears. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Fami-
lies, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 983-84 (1986). Some commentators also believe that em-
bryo research should be limited to questions "directly related to infertility."
Annas et. al., supra note 61, at 1332.
67. See Annas et al., supra note 61, at 1330.
68. STEINBOCK, supra note 54, at 197, 209.
69. See, e.g., Baruch Brody, Current Religious Perspectives on the New Re-
productive Technologies, in BEYOND BABY M: ETHICAL ISSUES IN NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES 45, 55-56 (D.M. Bartels ed., 1990) (discussing
Islamic law).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that the resulting children may marry their biological siblings
later in life, unaware of their genetic relationship, thereby vio-
lating religious proscriptions against consanguineous mar-
riages.70
II. RESOLVING CONFLICTS OVER THE DISPOSITION OF
FROZEN EMBRYOS: EXISTING LAW AND COMMENTARY
Conflicts over the disposition of frozen embryos can arise in
a variety of circumstances. Couples that create embryos in the
course of a committed relationship may disagree about what
should be done with the embryos when the relationship dis-
solves. If one partner dies, disappears, or loses decision-
making capacity, the other partner's decisions regarding the
embryos may be challenged by the storage facility or by other
family members, such as the adult children of the partner who
is not present.71
These disputes can take a variety of forms. They can be
conflicts between two persons who each want to use the em-
bryos-a woman who wants to become pregnant herself and a
man who wants the embryos for use with his new wife or part-
ner. Alternatively, one partner may want to use the embryos
and the other may want them donated to another person, used
by researchers, or destroyed. Disputes can arise even when
neither person seeks to use the embryos. For example, one per-
son may insist on destroying the embryos while the other wants
to donate the embryos to another patient or for scientific re-
search.
70. See id.; see also NOAM J. ZOHAR, ALTERNATIVES IN JEWISH BIOETHICS
73 (1997) (discussing Jewish law). In addition to violating religious proscrip-
tions, inadvertent consanguinity also increases the likelihood of transmitting
rare genetic conditions. See Anthonius de Boer et al., Determination of a
Maximum Number of Artificial Inseminations by Donor Children per Sperm
Donor, 63 FERTILITY & STERILITY 419, 419 (1995). For this reason, profes-
sional societies suggest that programs refrain from using gametes from the
same donor to create more than a specified number of pregnancies. See, e.g.,
American Fertility Society, Guidelines for Therapeutic Donor Insemination:
Sperm, 59 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1S, 4S (Supp. 1993) (suggesting a limit of
ten pregnancies per sperm donor).
71. Although no such cases have arisen involving frozen embryos, chal-
lenges to the use of frozen sperm have been brought by the adult children of
the depositor. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Ct.
App. 1993) (rejecting challenge by deceased man's adult children to distribu-
tion of man's frozen sperm to his former partner).
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A. THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
The contractual approach to decisions about frozen em-
bryos seeks to avoid disposition disputes by requiring couples to
enter into binding agreements about the future disposition of
their frozen embryos before they undergo IVF. This approach
has been endorsed by several courts and commentators, as well
as some state legislators.
1. Cases
Davis v. Davis,72 a Tennessee case decided in 1992, was the
first judicial decision in this country to address a conflict over
the disposition of frozen embryos.7 3 Davis involved a divorcing
couple who disputed the custody of seven frozen embryos cre-
ated during the couple's marriage.7 4 When the case was ini-
tially filed, the wife wanted to use the embryos to attempt to
have a child after the divorce.75 Her husband, citing his own
experience being raised apart from his natural parents, did not
want to father a child who would not live with both parents.7 6
By the time the case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court,
the wife no longer wanted to use the embryos herself; instead,
she wanted to donate the embryos to a childless couple. The
husband wanted the embryos to be destroyed.
Although the couple had not signed any written agreement
regarding the disposition of the embryos in the event of divorce,
the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the validity of such
agreements to provide guidance for future cases. The court
concluded that "an agreement regarding disposition of any un-
transferred [embryos] in the event of contingencies (such as the
death of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals,
or abandonment of the program) should be presumed valid and
should be enforced as between the progenitors."77 The court
stated that initial agreements could be modified as circum-
stances changed, but in the absence of a mutual modification
72. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
73. See id. at 589.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 603-04. When Mr. Davis was a child, his parents divorced
and his mother had a nervous breakdown. See id. at 603. Mr. Davis was
"raised at a home for boys run by the Lutheran Church." Id. He had monthly
visits with his mother but saw his father only a few times. See id.
77. Id. at 597.
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the prior agreements should be considered binding.78 Accord-
ing to the court, enforcing advance agreements regarding the
disposition of frozen embryos "is in keeping with the proposi-
tion that the progenitors, having provided the gametic material
giving rise to the [embryos], retain decision-making authority
as to their disposition."7 9
In the absence of an advance agreement, the court held,
the guiding principle for resolving disputes should be respect
for the parties' procreative autonomy. 80 Procreative autonomy,
the court concluded, includes both "the right to procreate and
the right to avoid procreation."81 The court specifically held
that the individuals' interest in procreative autonomy out-
weighs the state's interest in potential human life: "Certainly,
if the state's interests do not become sufficiently compelling in
the abortion context until the end of the first trimester, after
very significant developmental stages have passed, then surely
there is no state interest in these [embryos] which could suffice
to overcome the interests of the gamete-providers."
82
The court concluded that, on the facts before it, the hus-
band's interest in avoiding genetic parenthood outweighed the
wife's interest in becoming a genetic parent, largely because the
wife no longer wanted to use the embryos herself.83 If the wife
had wanted to use the embryos herself, the court indicated that
it would have considered whether she could have become a par-
ent through other means, including adoption or additional at-
tempts at IVF, without forcing the husband to become a genetic
parent against his will.84
In the only other decision by a state's highest court in-
volving a conflict over the disposition of frozen embryos, Kass v.
Kass,8 5 the New York Court of Appeals also endorsed the con-
tractual approach, this time as the central holding of the case.
Kass, like Davis, involved a dispute between a couple in the
midst of a divorce. The wife wanted to use frozen embryos cre-
ated during the couple's marriage in an attempt to become
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 598.
81. Id. at 601.
82. Id. at 602.
83. See id. at 604.
84. See id.
85. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
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pregnant after the divorce.86 The husband wanted the embryos
donated to scientific research.87 In support of his claim, the
husband relied on a consent form signed at the time the em-
bryos were frozen, which, he argued, reflected a clear intent
that any excess embryos would be used for research purposes. 88
The wife argued that the consent form was meant to apply only
in cases of death or incapacity, not if the couple divorced. 89
In a unanimous opinion, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that the consent form "unequivocally manifest[ed]"
the couple's intent to donate any excess embryos to scientific
research in the event of a dispute, including disputes arising in
the context of a divorce, and that this advance expression of the
couple's intent should be enforced.90 The court found that en-
forcing advance agreements governing the disposition of frozen
embryos would serve important policy goals. First, "[e]xplicit
agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions:
They are all the more necessary and desirable in personal mat-
ters of reproductive choice, where the intangible costs of any
litigation are simply incalculable." 9' Second, advance agree-
ments "minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative
liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make
what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal, private
decision."92 Third, advance agreements "provide the certainty
needed for effective operation of IVF programs."93 Finally, the
court suggested that the knowledge that advance agreements
will be enforced "underscores the seriousness and integrity of
the consent process" for couples undergoing IVF.94
In a footnote to the Kass opinion, the Court noted that ad-
vance agreements might be unenforceable if they violate public
policy or if significantly changed circumstances preclude en-
forcement.9 5 However, because the wife had not raised these
arguments, the court did not address them in its opinion.9 6
86. See id. at 177.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 176-77.
89. See id. at 181.
90. Id. at 180.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at n.4.
96. See id. In addition to Kass and Davis, a Florida trial court has en-
dorsed the contractual approach to the resolution of frozen embryo disputes.
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2. Legislation
While most states have not adopted legislation regarding
the disposition of frozen embryos, a statute in Florida expressly
embraces the contractual approach by directing couples and
physicians to "enter into a written agreement that provides for
the disposition of the commissioning couple's eggs, sperm, and
pre-embryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or
any other unforeseen circumstance."97 In other states, legisla-
tors have introduced similar bills.98
3. Commentary
Many academic commentators also advocate a contractual
approach to disposition decisions.99 John Robertson, a leading
That case, however, is distinguishable from the situation addressed in this Ar-
ticle because the husband's sperm was not used to create the embryos. In-
stead, the embryos were created with the wife's eggs and donor sperm. See
Associated Press, Judge Gives Mother Custody of Embryos, Sept. 19, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File (reporting on decision upholding
advance agreement giving control over the embryos to the wife); see also infra
Part V.C. (discussing the disposition of embryos created with donor sperm or
eggs).
A Massachusetts trial court also held that written agreements concerning
the disposition of frozen embryos should generally be enforced. See A.Z. v.
B.Z., No.15-008-96 (Suffolk County Prob. Ct., Mar. 25, 1996). In that case, the
couple had signed seven consent forms prior to freezing their embryos, all of
which stated that if the couple separated, the embryos should be given to the
wife. See id. at 8-11. Despite its general endorsement of the contractual ap-
proach, the court declined to enforce the couple's advance agreements because
it concluded that the circumstances had changed so significantly that en-
forcement of the agreements would be unfair. See id. at 24. Specifically, the
court found that, when the couple signed the agreement, they had not contem-
plated that they would have twins by IVF, the husband would file for divorce,
and the wife would then seek to use the embryos to have an additional child.
See id. The court concluded that "[t]hese concomitant events create[d] such a
change in circumstances that it cannot be said that either party contemplated
the current situation or contracted for the resolution of its occurrence." Id. at
25. Finding that "the man and woman are equal gamete-providers who should
be given equal authority in the decisions regarding the [embryos'] disposition,"
id. at 22, the court permanently enjoined the wife from using the embryos.
See id. at 28. While the opinion in AZ. purports to endorse the contractual
approach, the court's refusal to enforce the contract is arguably more consis-
tent with the proposal set forth in this Article. As discussed below, however,
the A.Z. court's reliance on the doctrine of changed circumstances was mis-
placed. See infra note 209.
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1998).
98. See, e.g., S.B. 1120, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999) (pending bill that would re-
quire couples entering IVF programs to execute written directives concerning
future disposition of any excess frozen embryos).
99. See, e.g., Christi D. Ahnen, Disputes over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins,
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authority on legal issues surrounding ARTs, argues that en-
forcing advance agreements for the disposition of frozen em-
bryos is the only way to protect the couple's interest in procrea-
tive autonomy.1°° If advance agreements are not enforced, he
maintains, "decisions about embryos will be made by others in
ways which might insufficiently value the reproductive con-
cerns of the persons involved." 10 Robertson compares advance
agreements for the disposition of frozen embryos with living
wills 10 2 and organ donor cards, 10 3 which, he argues, are ways to
protect "one's current interests and autonomy" by "direct[ing]
future events when the person is unable or unavailable to de-
cide."1°4 According to Robertson, "[fireedom to contract or to
make directives binding in future situations enhances liberty
even though it involves constraints on what may occur once the
future situation comes about."05
Robertson also argues that enforcing advance agreements
is necessary for the administrative efficiency of IVF programs.
If programs do not have the authority to rely on a couple's ad-
vance agreement, he contends, "[a] program would never be
able to dispose of embryos" if the couple is unavailable or un-
able to agree. 10 6 In addition, Robertson claims that enforcing
advance agreements will decrease the incidence of disputes
over the disposition of frozen embryos, because parties are un-
Who Loses, and How Do We Decide?, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299, 1344-50
(1991); Ingram, supra note 58, at 74-83; John A. Robertson, In the Beginning:
The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 463-73 (1990) [herein-
after Robertson, In the Beginning]; John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 407 (1990) [hereinafter
Robertson, Prior Agreements]; Mario J. Trespalacios, Frozen Embryos: To-
wards an Equitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 826 (1992); Paula Wal-
ter, His, Hers, or Theirs-Custody, Control, and Contracts: Allocating Deci-
sional Authority over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 937 (1999);
John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 7, 10-11 [hereinafter Robertson, Resolving
Disputes].
100. Robertson, PriorAgreements, supra note 99, at 415.
101. Id. ("If the prior agreement is not binding, then the IVF program, a
court, or a legislature will determine the disposition of frozen embryos.").
102. A living will is a document in which a competent adult sets forth di-
rections regarding medical treatment to be used in the event of a future loss of
decision-making capacity. See George J. Annas, The Health Care Proxy and
the Living Will, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1210, 1210 (1991).
103. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2 (1987) (authorizing individuals
to make an anatomical gift to take effect upon or after death).
104. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 99, at 415 n.28.
105. Id. at 415.
106. Id. at 417.
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likely to challenge disposition decisions that are consistent with
those set forth in an enforceable contract.10 7 Those disputes
that do arise, he suggests, will be less costly and less difficult to
litigate because the only issue will be the existence and inter-
pretation of the parties' agreement.10 8
The contractual approach to resolving disputes over the
disposition of frozen embryos also has broad support among
professional organizations and physicians involved in the prac-
tice of ARTs. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine
recommends that all IVF programs "require each couple con-
templating embryo storage to give written instruction con-
cerning disposition of embryos in the case of death, divorce,
separation, failure to pay storage charges, inability to agree on
disposition in the future, or lack of contact with the pro-
gram." 0 9 Likewise, two prominent IVF practitioners have
stated that no embryo should be frozen unless the program has
obtained "explicit informed consent vis-&-vis future disposi-
tion."110 A 1997 survey of IVF programs in New York State
found that some programs would not begin the process of egg
retrieval unless the couple had completed a form indicating not
only their understanding of the procedures but also their
wishes about various disposition options for both the eggs re-
trieved and any embryos created with those eggs."'
B. OTHER APPROACHES
Several other approaches to resolving disputes over the
disposition of frozen embryos also have been suggested in the
literature. 112 One supports resolving the dispute in favor of the
107. See id. at 418.
108. See id.
109. Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Ethical Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 67 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 1S, 1S (Supp. 1997).
110. Zev Rosenwaks & Owen K Davis, On the Disposition of Cryopreserved
Human Embryos: An Opinion, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1121, 1121 (1997).
111. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 298-99.
112. Some commentators argue that there might be no need to resolve dis-
putes over the disposition of frozen embryos if states limited the number of
eggs that could be fertilized in any given cycle. See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen
Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL
MED. 463, 496-97 (1992). This is the approach used in Germany, where prac-
titioners may not fertilize more than three eggs per retrieval. See H.M. Beier
& J.O. Beckman, German Embryo Protection Act (Oct. 24, 1990): Gesetz zum
Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz-Eschg), 6 HuM. REPROD. 605,
605 (1991). The problem with this approach is that it subjects the woman to
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partner who seeks to use the embryos to have a child, either in
all cases or if certain specified circumstances exist. Another
advocates destroying the embryos if the couple cannot agree. It
is not always clear, however, whether those who support these
positions view them as alternatives to the contractual approach
or as second-best solutions in cases where the parties have not
agreed to a disposition decision in advance.
1. Favoring the Partner Who Seeks To Use the Embryos
Giving the embryos to the partner who seeks to use them
to have a child has been proposed for several distinct reasons.
Some who take this position argue that embryos are persons
and deserve an opportunity to be brought to term. The trial
court in Davis adopted this approach, finding that disputes
over frozen embryos should be decided in a manner that would
promote the embryos' best interests. 113 Accordingly, the court
granted full custody of the embryos to the wife because she
would "bring [these children] to term through implantation.""l4
Others who believe that disputes should be resolved in fa-
vor of the party seeking to procreate do not rely on the embryos'
moral status. Instead, they argue that, by undergoing IVF, a
couple creates an implied contract to use any embryos they
produce to attempt to have a child.'1 5 As a result, if one of the
partners wishes to use the embryo to have a child and the other
does not, the dispute should be resolved in favor of the partner
seeking to reproduce-either the woman, by using the embryo
herself, or the man, by transferring the embryo to his new wife
additional medications and egg retrievals, which carry significant physical
risks. See supra notes 14-15. In addition, many couples will be unable to af-
ford the cost of multiple cycles.
113. See Davis v. Davis, 15 Family L. Rptr. 2097, 2097 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.
1989), reu'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
114. Id.
115. See Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26
CONN. L. REV. 305, 345-46 (1993) ("It is... easy to find an implied contract
between two parties who attempt IVF: participation in an IVF program is con-
duct that reasonably leads to the assumption that both parties have commit-
ted to reproduction."). Feliciano also relies on the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel: because the partner who wants to use the embryos reasonably relied,
to her detriment, on the other partner's commitment to reproduce jointly, "the
partner who opposes implantation of the embryos should be estopped from as-
serting his or her right not to reproduce." Id. at 346; see Trespalacios, supra
note 99, at 829 (claiming that "through the bilateral exchange of promises to
complete the IVF process by the exchange of gametes for the engineering of
a[n] [embryo], the parties create a contract whether or not they have signed a
written agreement").
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or partner or to a surrogate. 116 Supporters of this approach ac-
knowledge that the partner opposing reproduction will be
forced to accept the "tremendous psychological burden in
knowing that one has biological offspring," but they argue that
this burden is justified by the implied commitment to reproduce
at the time the embryos were created.'17
Some commentators maintain that, while the rights of the
partner seeking to avoid reproduction normally deserve protec-
tion, an exception should be made if the partner who seeks to
use the embryos has no other way of having a biologically-
related child. For example, Lee Silver and Susan Remis Silver
argue that the critical question is "which party has a constitu-
tional right that, once lost, can never be regained."' 8 When the
partner seeking to use the embryos is physically unable to pro-
duce additional sperm or eggs, they argue, both partners have
"irrevocable constitutional rights" at stake-the right to avoid
biological parenthood for one partner and the right to become a
biological parent for the other. In such situations, they advo-
cate a case-by-case analysis in which the interests of the part-
ner seeking to use the embryos would carry considerable
weight.119
Finally, some commentators argue that, when the woman
seeks to use the embryos to have a child, her partner's objection
is not entitled to respect because the woman's interest in the
embryos is inherently greater than the man's. Ruth Colker, for
example, emphasizes that, in most cases, it is far more difficult
to retrieve an egg from a woman than it is to retrieve sperm
116. For a description of surrogacy, see supra note 16.
117. Feliciano, supra note 115, at 349 (arguing further that the partner op-
posing reproduction may be able to avoid the legal responsibilities of biological
parenthood by consenting to the adoption of the child by the other partner's
new spouse); see also Heidi Forster et al., Comment on ABA's Proposed Frozen
Embryo Disposition Policy, 71 FERTILITY & STERILITY 994, 994 (1999) (re-
porting on a proposal by the American Bar Association's Section on Family
Law that would have given control of frozen embryos to "'the party wishing to
proceed in good faith and in a reasonable time, with gestation to term, and to
assume parental rights and responsibilities).
118. Lee M. Silver & Susan Remis Silver, Confused Heritage and the Ab-
surdity of Genetic Ownership, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 593, 614 (1998).
119. See id. at 614-16 (suggesting that, "[i]f the non-consenting party sim-
ply wants to avoid having custody or financial responsibility, a court could
convert the party's status from being the parent of a frozen embryo to being an
'egg donor' or 'sperm donor' without the custody or financial obligations of par-
enthood").
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from a man.120 Because embryos, once created, are "more valu-
able to the woman than to the man and are more essential to
her capability to become a parent," Colker argues, "we should
generally decide these cases in favor of the woman when she
desires to use the frozen embryos to further her reproductive
capacity."121
Some commentators taking this position draw an analogy
to the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,122 which struck down a law requiring spousal consent to
most abortions on the ground that the woman's physical in-
vestment in pregnancy and childbirth gives her the right to de-
termine whether a pregnancy should be continued. 123 The trial
court in Kass v. Kass made this analogy, concluding that be-
cause pregnant women have the right to continue the preg-
nancy without regard to their partners' wishes, 124 they also
should have the right to decide that a frozen embryo will be
brought to term.125 According to the court, allowing a man to
stop a woman from using a frozen embryo, when he could not
force her to abort a fetus already in the womb, would "favor si-
tus over substance" 126 by conditioning the woman's right to
make decisions about whether to have a child on whether con-
ception occurs naturally or through IVF.
120. See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are
Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1063, 1074 (1996). However, while sperm is gen-
erally obtained through masturbation, invasive medical procedures may be
required for men who cannot ejaculate or in whom part of the reproductive
tract is missing or blocked. See Kwang-Yul Cha et al., Approaches for Obtain-
ing Sperm in Patients with Male Factor Infertility, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY
985, 985 (1997).
121. Colker, supra note 120, at 1079. The Israeli Supreme Court appeared
to adopt this approach in a 1996 dispute between a divorcing couple. In that
case, the wife, who wanted to use the embryos, was 42 years old and could
probably not produce any more eggs. The court concluded that "[a] woman's
right to be a parent prevails over the husband's right not to be a parent." Joel
Greenberg, Israeli Court Gives Wife Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
13, 1996, at A10.
122. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
123. See id. at 69. For comments, see, for example, Feliciano, supra note
115, at 318-19.
124. N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1995, at 34 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. 1995), rev'd,
663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1997), affd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
125. See id.
126. Id.
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2. Destroying the Embryos If the Couple Cannot Agree
Some commentators maintain that when couples cannot
agree about the disposition of their frozen embryos, the best
solution is for the embryos to be destroyed. Those who take
this position emphasize the harm that would arise if the em-
bryos were used by either partner over the other's objection.
Noting that "[g]enetic ties may form a powerful bond between
an individual and his or her progeny even if the progenitor is
freed from the legal obligations of parenthood," Patricia Martin
and Martin Lagod suggest that "forcing one to become a genetic
parent may work a quiet form of violence and violate a vital
freedom."127 To avoid this outcome, they argue that in cases
where the couple cannot agree, the embryos should be thawed
and discarded. "Preembryo loss," they maintain, "is the price of
the progenitors' freedom and mutual dependence." 128
In a still-pending case in New Jersey, a trial court ap-
peared to adopt this view. 129 In that case, a couple undergoing
a divorce could not agree about the disposition of seven frozen
embryos created during the couple's marriage. 130 The wife
wanted the embryos destroyed, but the husband wanted to pre-
serve the embryos for possible use with a new partner or dona-
tion to another couple. 131 Finding that the raison d'gtre for the
couple's infertility treatment was for the couple "to conceive a
child for themselves,"132 the court ordered the embryos de-
stroyed. 133 The fact that the husband was not infertile and did
not need to use the embryos to become a parent also contrib-
uted to the court's conclusion.134
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL CONSENT
In place of the approaches described above, the remainder
of this Article proposes an alternative framework for resolving
127. Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, The
Progenitors, and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and
Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257, 290 (1990).
128. Id. at 291.
129. See J.B. v. M.B., FM-04-95-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 1998), appeal
docketed, No. A-1544-98T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 1999).
130. See id. at 4.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 6.
133. See id. at 8.
134. See id. ("We know that the husband has a reasonable probability of
achieving parenthood by means other than the use of the frozen embryos.").
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disputes over the disposition of frozen embryos. Like the con-
tractual approach, this framework starts with the premise that
decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos belong to the
couple' 35 that created the embryo, with each partner entitled to
an equal say in how the embryos should be disposed. This Part
explains why objections to disposition decisions by either part-
ner should be respected, both to lay the groundwork for the cri-
tique of the contractual approach in Part IV and to respond to
the approaches described in Part II that would give one partner
greater decision-making rights. 136
The basic point developed in this Part is that, in the ab-
sence of the partners' mutual consent, carrying out any of the
affirmative disposition options outlined above-use by one
partner, donation to another patient, destruction, or use in re-
search-would impose greater burdens on the objecting partner
than keeping the embryo frozen would impose on the partner
whose preferred disposition option is not enforced. Thus, any
rules for the disposition of frozen embryos should require the
consent of both partners before any of these irrevocable disposi-
tion decisions is carried out.13 7
A. OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF THE EMBRYOS BY ONE PARTNER
Consider the case where one partner wants to use the cou-
ple's frozen embryos to have a child, but the other partner does
not. In these situations, the partner who opposes the use of the
embryos can claim a strong interest in avoiding genetic parent-
hood. 38 In some cases, this interest may reflect practical con-
cerns about the possible legal and financial obligations result-
ing from becoming a biological parent. 39  Even if those
135. For purposes of this Article, the term 'couple" refers to any heterosex-
ual intimate relationship, regardless of whether the partners are married.
Same-sex relationships are not included because they necessarily involve the
use of either sperm or eggs from outside the relationship. In addition, the dis-
cussion that follows, like the cases and commentary discussed in Part II, as-
sumes that both partners contributed their own gametes to the creation of the
embryos. For a discussion of embryos created with donor sperm and/or eggs,
see infra Part V.C.
136. See supra Part II.B.1.
137. The argument developed herein is grounded in considerations of pub-
lic policy, not constitutional law. Thus, the point is not that the law must re-
quire mutual consent to disposition decisions. Rather, it is that enforcing a
disposition decision over either partner's objection would be bad public policy.
138. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992).
139. A child's biological parents are both responsible for supporting the
child. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 513 (McKinney 1999). In New
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obligations were extinguished, 140 the objecting partner would
still have to live with the knowledge that he has genetic off-
spring, and "with the powerful attendant reverberations of
guilt, attachment, or responsibility which that knowledge can
ignite."141 As demonstrated by the experience of parents who
have relinquished their children for adoption, this knowledge
can impose lifelong psychological and emotional burdens. 142
Regardless of whether the interest in avoiding genetic parent-
hood rises to the level of a constitutional right, 143 it is signifi-
cant enough to warrant substantial consideration as a matter
of public policy.
Balanced against this interest in avoiding genetic parent-
hood is the other partner's desire to use the embryos to have a
child. However, if this partner is able to have children without
using the couple's remaining frozen embryos (for example,
through coital reproduction or additional attempts at IVF with
another partner), she can achieve her goal of becoming a parent
without making the objecting partner a genetic parent against
York, a mother's agreement to waive the father's obligations will not be en-
forced unless a court determines that "adequate provision has been made" for
the child through other means. Id. § 516(a); see also Straub v. B.M.T., 645
N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 1994) (refusing to enforce an unmarried woman's pre-
conception agreement not to hold a man liable for child support, finding that
such agreements violate the state's "public policy of protecting the welfare of
children" through ensuring their financial security from both parents).
140. Most states have laws that extinguish the parental rights and respon-
sibilities of gamete and/or embryo donors, at least in some circumstances. See
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 327-34, 339-40. Some com-
mentators have argued that these laws should be extended to situations where
one partner uses a couple's frozen embryos over the other partner's objection;
in such cases, the objecting partner would be treated as an embryo "donor"
with no parental rights or responsibilities. See, e.g., Silver & Silver, supra
note 118, at 615.
141. Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 99, at 479; see also Forster et.
al., supra note 117, at 994 (arguing that "[t]he use of one's unique genetic ma-
terial to create a child against one's will, even if one is not required to provide
for the child, is a violation of one's bodily integrity and personal choice").
142. See Leverett Miller & Samuel Roll, Solomon's Mothers. A Special Case
of Pathological Bereavement, 55(3) AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 411, 412 (1985)
(finding that women who have relinquished a child for adoption continue to
feel a "bond of such enduring intensity that time and physical separation often
do not seem to weaken the affinity of the mother for the child").
143. See Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 99, at 499-500 (arguing
that, although "[al cogent argument, based on Supreme Court contraceptive
cases, exists for finding a fundamental right to avoid biologic offspring," such
an argument is unlikely to be recognized by a "Supreme Court disinclined to
expand the menu of unwritten fundamental rights").
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his will. In such cases, the interests of the partner seeking to
use the embryos are comparatively weak.1'
If the partner seeking to use the embryos is unable to have
children through other means, her desire to use the couple's
remaining frozen embryos may seem stronger. 45 Yet, the fact
that a person has a deep desire to have genetic offspring does
not mean that she has a right to do so through any possible
means. The embryos would not exist but for the contribution of
both partners' genetic material. Because the embryos are the
products of the couple's shared procreative activity, any deci-
sion to use them should be the result of the couple's mutual
choice.
It is true that requiring mutual consent for the use of the
embryos may impose a hardship for the partner who is unable
to have genetic children through other means. But it is impor-
tant to keep in mind the context in which the embryos were
originally created-a mutual undertaking by the couple to have
children together. 46 Once the mutuality of the endeavor has
ended, the fact that one partner is no longer able to have ge-
netic offspring should not give her the right to disregard her
partner's objections and appropriate the embryos for her own
exclusive use. It is not as if the partner who objects to the use
of the embryos was the cause of the other partner's inability to
have genetic offspring. Rather, the inability to have children is
the result of external factors, such as age or physiological im-
pairment. 47 The objecting partner should not be forced to ex-
144. See id. at 480 ("As long as the party wishing to reproduce could create
other embryos, the desire to avoid biologic offspring should take priority over
the desire to reproduce with the embryos in question.").
145. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
146. See J.B. v. M.B., FM-04-95-97, at 6 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 1998)
(observing that the raison d'itre for the couple's infertility treatment was for
the couple "to conceive a child for themselves").
147. For a discussion of the factors that contribute to male and female in-
fertility, see NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 16-35. One of the
primary factors leading to female infertility is age. See id. at 16-18. Thus, if
the law permitted the unilateral use of the embryos by a partner unable to
have genetic children through other means, "any divorcing woman over 40
years old could reasonably claim disputed embryos on the ground that age-
related infertility.., makes it highly unlikely that she would be able to suc-
ceed with her own eggs during later cycles of IVF." John A. Robertson, Dispo-
sition of Frozen Embryos by Divorcing Couples Without Prior Agreement, 71
FERTILITY & STERILITY 997, 997-98 (1999). If this argument were accepted,
an exception to the mutual consent principle for partners unable to have ge-
netic children through other means could very well "swallow the rule." Id. at
997.
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perience the burdens of unwanted genetic parenthood to rem-
edy a situation he did nothing to create. 148
In addition, requiring mutual consent for the use of frozen
embryos would not impose an absolute limitation on either
partner's ability to become a parent. Even if one partner is un-
able to produce additional embryos, adoption would still be an
option. 149 While adoption does not further the individual's in-
terest in becoming a genetic parent, it does further the interest
in having children to rear. 150
While some commentators have argued that a partner un-
able to produce additional embryos has a constitutional right to
use the couple's remaining frozen embryos to have a child, 151
that argument rests on a distorted interpretation of the consti-
tutional interests at stake. To the extent there is support for a
constitutional right to procreate, 152 it is grounded in cases pro-
148. In some cases, the partner who wishes to use the embryos may claim
that she is unable to have children because she delayed reproduction in reli-
ance on the availability of her previously-frozen embryos, and that the object-
ing partner is responsible for this reliance-induced inability to procreate. For
a response to this argument, see infra text accompanying notes 296-97.
149. In contrast to the low success rates of ARTs, see supra notes 17-18 and
accompanying text, "[it is exceptionally rare for a couple who have carefully
decided on adoption, responsibly educated themselves about its issues, and
aggressively pursued a variety of avenues toward the goal not to be successful
in finding a child to parent." PATRICIA IRWIN JOHNSTON, ADOPTING AFTER
INFERTILITY 84 (1992). Some commentators criticize society's tendency to
treat adoption as a second-best alternative to family building. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING 164-86 (1993).
150. The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized this point in Davis. See
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that even if the wife
"were unable to undergo another round of IVF, or opted not to try, she could
still achieve the child-rearing aspects of parenthood through adoption"). But
see David L. Theyssen, Balancing Interests in Frozen Embryo Disputes: Is
Adoption Really a Reasonable Alternative?, 74 IND. L.J. 711, 712 (1999) ("In
light of the special concerns and difficulties relevant to adoption, it should not
be forced upon the parent wishing to implant the embryos as an equal alterna-
tive to child birth if no other genetic options are available.").
151. See Silver & Silver, supra note 118, at 614.
152. The Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized an affirmative
right to procreate, as opposed to a right to avoid procreation through contra-
ception or abortion. Nonetheless, most commentators agree that such a right
can be inferred, at least for married couples, from cases recognizing a constitu-
tional right of privacy. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra 19, at 37 (arguing that "a
married couple's right to reproduce would be recognized even by conservative
justices if a case restricting coital reproduction ever reached the Supreme
Court"). It is unlikely that such a right would extend to all forms of ARTs,
particularly those that rely on the use of third parties, such as gamete donors
or surrogate carriers. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
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tecting the intimacy of private relationships and promoting the
development of family bonds. 53 As Radhika Rao has argued, it
is the underlying relationship in which procreative decisions
are made that is protected, not "the individual's solo right" to
engage in activities that may lead to having a child. 54 An indi-
vidual's unilateral decision to have a child without regard to
her partner's views is simply not the sort of intimate activity to
which the right to procreate is meant to apply. Even if the
partner who wishes to use the embryos is unable to reproduce
through other means, having a child by appropriating the ge-
netic material of someone who objects cannot plausibly be in-
terpreted as a constitutionally protected right.155
The gender of the partner seeking to use the embryos
should not affect the analysis of the competing interests at
stake. 156 While a woman has the right to decide whether to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1360 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that the abortion and con-
traception cases do not "automatically entitle infertile couples (or individual
men and women, fertile or infertile) to buy genetic material from others or to
contract for gestation 'services'"). Yet, there is a strong argument that it
should apply to a couple's use of frozen embryos created with both partners'
gametes, as this type of activity implicates nearly all of the factors that un-
derlie the constitutional protection of coital reproduction within marriage. For
example, a couple's use of their frozen embryos takes place in the context of an
intimate relationship; it allows the couple to produce and raise their genetic
progeny; and it permits the woman to have the experience of pregnancy and
childbirth. See generally NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 144-
46.
153. See Ann M. Massie, Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Law Response
to Professor John A. Robertson's Children of Choice, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
135, 161 (1995) ("The marriage relationship, with its concomitant intimacy,
thus lies at the heart of the constitutionally protected right of privacy.").
154. Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1103 (1998) ("Privacy does not simply
guarantee individuals the right to sexual, reproductive, and parental auton-
omy. It protects the relationships between people that develop in the course of
these activities, rather than the individual's solo right to engage in such ac-
tivities."); see also id. at 1116 (arguing that, "[wihen there is dissent among
the individuals involved in a relationship, individual assertions of a right to
privacy become incoherent").
155. The fact that the partner seeking to procreate does not have a consti-
tutionally-protected right to use the embryos over the other partner's objection
does not mean that a state could not choose to favor the wishes of the partner
seeking to have a child as a means of promoting its interest in potential hu-
man life. However, a state is not required to assert an interest in the potential
life of cryopreserved embryos, and to date only one state has arguably done so.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1998) (prohibiting the destruction of
human embryos).
156. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
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terminate a pregnancy regardless of her partner's views,157 that
right stems from her interest in bodily integrity-her right to
choose whether to use her body to carry a fetus to term. When
embryos exist outside the body, the woman's interest in con-
trolling her body during pregnancy is not at stake. 58
It is true that the woman's physical investment in the crea-
tion of an embryo is usually greater than that of the man. 159
However, at the time a disposition dispute arises, those physi-
cal contributions have already occurred. At that point, the
primary issue for both partners is whether they will become
biological parents, an issue that affects both of them equally. 60
Moreover, the burdens of unwanted genetic parenthood will
last a lifetime. As such, they will greatly outweigh either part-
ner's short-term physical investment at the time the embryos
were initially created.
It is also significant that any bodily invasions the woman
experienced when the embryos were created were the result of
her own voluntary choice. By contrast, when the Court struck
down a law requiring spousal consent to abortions in Danforth,
it did so because the law itself infringed on the woman's right
to bodily integrity: absent the consent of the woman's partner,
the law required the woman to undergo the physically invasive
experience of pregnancy and childbirth. 161 Because honoring a
man's objection to the use of frozen embryos does not require
the invasion of his partner's bodily integrity, the physical impo-
sition on the woman to create the embryos should not give her
greater decision-making rights.
B. OBJECTIONS To DONATING THE EMBRYOS
If it is inappropriate to allow one partner to use a frozen
embryo over the other partner's objection, there is even less
justification for allowing the donation of a frozen embryo to an-
other person when one partner objects. Donation does not fur-
157. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
158. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (concluding that
"disposition of these [embryos] does not implicate a woman's right of privacy or
bodily integrity in the area of reproductive choice").
159. There are some cases where the man also must undergo invasive
medical procedures. See Cha et. al., supra note 120, at 985.
160. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that, al-
though "it is fair to say that women contribute more to the IVF process than
men," the couple, "[als they stand on the brink of potential parenthood," have
equivalent interests at stake).
161. See 428 U.S. at 67-71.
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ther the procreative liberty of either partner. Although it may
lead to the birth of biological offspring, the absence of any in-
tention to develop a relationship with those offspring distin-
guishes it from the type of activity that the right to procreate is
designed to protect. 162 Even if the partner who seeks to donate
excess embryos has strong religious convictions that favor giv-
ing the embryos a chance to be born, 163 it would be unfair to
allow that person to pursue those convictions by making the
objecting partner a biological parent against his or her will.16
C. OBJECTIONS TO THE DESTRUCTION OR RESEARCH USE OF THE
EMBRYOS
Finally, the couple's mutual consent should be required be-
fore an embryo is destroyed, including cases where the embryo
is used in scientific research and then destroyed. 65 A person
whose religious or moral objections to destruction are ignored
may be burdened with a profound sense of grief, regret, and
guilt. 66 One need not agree with the perspective that embryos
are persons to recognize that people who hold this position will
162. See, e.g., Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control,
Woman Control, or Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1, 80 (1992) (character-
izing the right to procreate as the "right to produce one's own children to
rear"); Bonnie Steinbock, Review Essay/Procreative Liberty, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICs, Winter/Spring 1996, at 67, 72 ("[T/he 'right to reproduce' is meaning-
ful only when there is an intention, as well as an ability, to assume the role of
parent.").
163. See supra Part I.D.
164. It might be argued that if a partner's desire to donate the embryos is
grounded in a religious conviction that the embryos deserve a chance to be
brought to term, a rule prohibiting donation without mutual consent would
implicate that partner's First Amendment rights. However, such an argument
is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's recent rulings in the area of
religious freedom. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990) (holding that burdens on religious freedom that are incidental effects of
generally applicable and otherwise valid laws do not violate the First Amend-
ment).
165. Whether a state may prohibit the destruction of embryos even with
the couple's mutual consent is not entirely clear. Compare Rao, supra note
154, at 1118-19 (stating that "even a decision to discard extracorporeal em-
bryos, though distinguishable from the act of abortion because it implicates no
right of bodily integrity, might well be included within the couple's right of
relational privacy on the grounds that it involves their formation of a family"),
with Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 99, at 527-30 (suggesting that
laws prohibiting the destruction of human embryos would be upheld because
they do not burden the right to avoid gestation and pregnancy).
166. Cf. Perry & Schneider, supra note 112, at 494 ("When an embryo is
lost, some gamete providers have mourned them as if a child has died.").
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likely experience the destruction of their embryos as a signifi-
cant loss. 167 While requiring mutual consent to destruction
may frustrate the wishes of the partner who prefers that the
embryos be destroyed, the burdens of continued storage on that
partner do not compare to those that would be experienced by
someone whose embryos are destroyed against her will. As
long as it is clear that the embryo may not be used to create a
child without the couple's mutual consent, a requirement that
both partners consent to destruction would simply mean that
the embryos would stay where they are-in frozen storage. It
would not infringe on either partner's right to chQose whether
the embryos will be used. 168
IV. CONSENT, CONTRACTS, AND INALIENABILE RIGHTS
In theory, the contractual approach to the resolution of
disputes over the disposition of frozen embryos adheres to the
mutual consent principle articulated in Part III. According to
the contractual approach, the couple's consent is provided be-
fore the embryo is initially frozen; a subsequent change of mind
by one of the partners does not make the original consent any
less valid. Indeed, the judicial decisions and academic com-
mentary that support the contractual approach all emphasize
the importance of respecting the couple's mutual right to con-
trol their embryos' fates. 169
Yet, despite its apparent deference to the couple's mutual
wishes, the contractual approach insufficiently protects the in-
dividual and societal interests at stake. First, decisions about
the disposition of frozen embryos implicate rights central to in-
dividual identity. On matters of such fundamental personal
importance, individuals are entitled to make decisions consis-
tent with their contemporaneous wishes, values, and beliefs. 70
167. Thus, in J.B. v. M.B., the court was wrong to dismiss the husband's
objection to destruction simply because frozen embryos are not considered
"living entities" as a matter of law. FM-04-95-97, at 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept.
28, 1998). The fact that the law does not regard embryos as persons is not the
point; if one of the partners who created the embryos believes that embryos
are persons, those views are entitled to the law's respect. Rather than order-
ing the embryos destroyed, the court should have entered an order prohibiting
the use of the embryos but permitting the husband to store them indefinitely
at his own expense. See infra Part V.A.
168. The financial burdens of continued storage could be imposed on the
party who opposes destruction. See infra Part V.A.
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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Second, requiring couples to make binding decisions about the
future use of their frozen embryos ignores the difficulty of pre-
dicting one's future response to life-altering events such as par-
enthood.171  Third, conditioning the provision of infertility
treatment on the execution of binding disposition agreements is
coercive and calls into question the authenticity of the couple's
original choice. 17 2 Finally, treating couples' decisions about the
future use of their frozen embryos as binding contracts under-
mines important values about families, reproduction, and the
strength of genetic ties. 173
In place of the contractual approach, this Part argues that
the right to consent or to withhold consent to the disposition of
one's frozen embryos should be treated as an inalienable
right-a right that cannot be relinquished irrevocably until a
disposition decision actually will be carried out. 174 Under this
approach, advance disposition agreements would still play an
important role, 17 5 but if one of the parties to the agreement
changes his or her mind, the mutual consent principle would no
longer be satisfied and the previously agreed-upon disposition
decision could not be enforced. Instead, the embryo would re-
main in frozen storage until the parties reach a new agreement,
the embryo is no longer viable, or storage facilities are no
longer available. 7 6 As discussed below, this approach would
respect the rights of both partners while providing clear and
easily-administered rules for practitioners, storage facilities,
and the courts. 177
This Part begins by recasting the issue presented by ad-
vance disposition agreements. Rather than a simple choice be-
tween respecting the partners' decisions or allowing the deci-
sions to be made by someone else, the question whether to
enforce advance disposition agreements requires a judgment
about the meaning of respecting a person's decisions when that
person's values and desires change. The Part then defends the
position that respecting the partners' decision-making author-
ity with regard to the disposition of frozen embryos means al-
171. See infra Part 1V.B.2.
172. See infra Part IV.B.3.
173. See infra Part IV.B.4.
174. See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
176. See infra Part V.A.
177. For a discussion of the practical applications of this approach, see in-
fra Part V.
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lowing them to change their minds until a disposition decision
is implemented.
A. THE NATURE OF THE DILEMMA: RESPECTING CHOICE WHEN
PEOPLE CHANGE
Consider the following scenario:
A married couple enters into an IVF program, hoping to
have their first child after many years of infertility. Neither
partner has ever had a child. Before treatment begins, the
couple signs an agreement that will govern the disposition of
their frozen embryos in a variety of circumstances, including
death, incapacity, or divorce. The couple agrees that if one of
these unlikely scenarios ever arises, the embryos should be do-
nated to an infertile couple who is unable to produce embryos
on their own. They reason that donating the embryos would be
a charitable act that would allow some good to come out of a
painful situation like death or divorce.
Several years pass. The couple, after producing several
dozen embryos during multiple treatment cycles, has two chil-
dren. Nine of the couple's embryos remain in frozen storage.
Unfortunately, the couple's marriage deteriorates. What was
unthinkable at the time treatment began becomes a reality: the
couple decides to divorce. The husband, relying on the advance
agreement, wants the nine frozen embryos donated to an infer-
tile couple. The wife now finds this unacceptable. She states
that when she signed the disposition agreement she had no
idea what it would mean to her to be a parent. Now that she
has two children, the idea of donating her embryos to another
couple, who might give birth to and raise her children, offends
her deeply. Rather than donating the embryos, she would pre-
fer to use them herself, to destroy them, or to keep them frozen
indefinitely.
According to the contractual approach, the solution to the
couple's dispute is clear: the prior agreement to donate the em-
bryos should be enforced. Because the prior agreement was
based on the couple's mutual consent, supporters of the con-
tractual approach would argue, enforcing it is the only way to
protect both partners' right to determine how the embryos will
be used.17 8
There is a peculiar quality to this argument, however. Al-
though the rationale for enforcing the agreement is that doing
178. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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so will protect both partners' decision-making rights, the re-
sult-donating the embryos to an infertile couple-is precisely
what the wife does not want. The position makes sense only if
one assumes that the wife's original consent to donation re-
mains "her decision" even after she has changed her mind. If
donating the embryos can be considered the wife's own choice,
it is possible both to ignore her current objections to donation
and to claim respect for her underlying right to decide.
From the wife's current perspective, however, this argu-
ment is unlikely to carry much weight. Her original consent to
donation, she might argue, was made before she became a par-
ent. She had no idea what it would mean to her to give birth to
her genetic offspring, and she could not possibly appreciate
what it would feel like to have her children born to and raised
by someone else. In fact, from her current perspective, her
prior decision may seem like the decision of a completely differ-
ent person-the person she was before she became a parent
and understood what donating her embryos would really
mean.179 In the words of Anthony Kronman, she may regard
this prior decision "as a foreign element whose continuing in-
fluence appears senseless from the standpoint of [her] present
goals."180 While donating the embryos might be respectful of
the wishes of this previous version of herself, it does not respect
the rights and interests of the person she is today.
Viewed in this light, the argument that enforcing prior
agreements respects both partners' right to control the em-
bryos' fate is only partially correct. Enforcing a couple's prior
agreements respects the decision-making authority of the per-
sons the partners were at the time the agreement was made,
but if one of the partners has experienced a major change-if
she has become a "new person," as many people perceive them-
selves after major life events such as parenthood-enforcing
the agreement may be profoundly disrespectful of the person
this partner has become.
The question, then, becomes this: If the principle of mutual
consent set forth in Part III is accepted, and it is true that peo-
ple change in fundamental ways over time, at what time does
the partners' consent matter? Should the law protect the
179. Some philosophers maintain that people change in such substantial
ways over time that they actually become different "selves." See, e.g., DEREK
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 326-29 (1984).
180. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763, 782 (1983).
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wishes of the partners at the time the embryos are created, or
should the mutual consent principle be interpreted to require
the consent of the partners when the decision will be carried
out? Put another way, the question is not simply whether the
partners will control the disposition of their embryos, but which
phase of an individual's evolving personality has priority when
her wishes at the time the embryos were created differ from
those at the time the decision will be carried out.
This question, of course, is by no means limited to the dis-
position of frozen embryos. In virtually all areas of human ac-
tivity, people change their minds about agreements made in
the past. For example, a person may commit to buying goods at
a particular price and then regret it if the market price goes
down. The owner of a business may agree to sell her company
and then change her mind because she fears that she will have
nothing interesting to occupy her time. In general, the law
does not consider these changes of heart a sufficient excuse for
failing to adhere to the original agreement. Except in a limited
number of circumstances, such as those involving fraud,'8 ' du-
ress,182 or mental incapacity, 8 3 the law treats the individual's
prior commitment as legally binding; her current wishes and
interests are subordinated to those she expressed in the past.
In a few situations, however, the law takes a different ap-
proach. In some circumstances, the law treats certain rights as
inalienable, meaning that promises to relinquish these rights
are not enforceable if the person who made the promise
changes her mind. 8 4 For example, the law in most states will
not enforce a promise to marry, 8 5 nor will it enforce an agree-
181. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981)
(stating that contracts induced by fraud are voidable).
182. See id. § 175 ("If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an
improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alter-
native, the contract is voidable by the victim.").
183. See id. § 12 ("No one can be bound by contract who has not legal ca-
pacity to incur at least voidable contractual duties.").
184. The examples of inalienable rights discussed in the text involve pri-
vate agreements between two individuals. Other types of inalienable rights
also exist. For example, criminal defendants cannot irrevocably waive their
right to be present at trial in a capital case, see Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 455 (1912), to raise a plea of incompetence to stand trial, see Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1966), or to assert a privilege against self in-
crimination, see Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 244 (1966).
185. See generally Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Action, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1770, 1771 (1985) (discussing state statutes abolishing actions for breach
of a promise to marry).
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ment never to seek a divorce. 186 An individual may change her
mind about whether or not to have children during marriage,
even if a prior agreement about reproduction was the founda-
tion on which the marriage was built. 18 7 A woman's promise to
have an abortion, or to refrain from having an abortion, is not
legally binding.188
Two important examples of inalienable rights relate to de-
cisions about relinquishing a relationship with one's biological
offspring. First, state laws governing adoption typically impose
significant limitations on a parent's ability to relinquish a
child. In most states, agreements to relinquish parental rights
made before a child is born are ineffective if the mother
changes her mind. 8 9 Even after birth, the law generally gives
parents a "cooling off' period to reconsider any decision to re-
linquish parental rights.190
Similarly, in most states, agreements in which women
promise to gestate a child and then relinquish it after birth-
so-called "surrogate parenting" arrangements 191-are void and
186. See 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§
1741-43 (3d ed. 1972). Under so-called "covenant marriage" statutes, couples
may agree to narrow the circumstances under which divorce will be available,
but these statutes do not foreclose the option of divorce entirely. See Elizabeth
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1226-27 (1998) (discussing covenant marriage statutes in Louisiana and
Arizona).
187. See Capron, supra note 8, at 33 ("Certainly a couple's agreement, prior
to marriage, that they would have children would not be sufficient to compel
them to go forward with reproduction if either concluded that he or she did not
want to become a parent with the other."); cf McCann v. McCann, 593
N.Y.S.2d 917, 923 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that a husband's fraudulent prom-
ise to have children with his wife following their marriage, although "morally
reprehensible," did not constitute an "egregious marital fault" for purposes of
equitable distribution statute).
188. See Martha A. Bohn, Contracts Concerning Abortion, 31 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAMA. L. 515, 525-27 (1992-1993) (discussing a Kentucky case
that found that contracts in which one person pays another to obtain an abor-
tion are void as against public policy).
189. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Mooney, 407 So. 2d 559, 563 (Ala. 1981) (per cu-
riam); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255, 260 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
190. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie 1998); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.08(A) (Anderson 1998).
191. In some surrogate parenting arrangements, the child is conceived with
the surrogate's own egg. In these situations (sometimes referred to as "tradi-
tional surrogacy" or "geneticlgestational surrogacy"), the surrogate is the
child's biological mother in all respects. In other cases, embryos created with
the egg and sperm of the intended parents are implanted in the surrogate,
who then carries the pregnancy to term. In these situations (generally known
as "gestational surrogacy"), the surrogate is the gestational mother but is not
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unenforceable if the woman changes her mind. For example,
under New York's surrogate parenting statute, if a surrogate
mother changes her mind and refuses to relinquish the child
after it is born, the woman retains the legal rights of any
mother. 192 In such situations, the law directs courts to deter-
mine issues of custody, visitation, and support as they would in
any dispute between a mother and father who are not living to-
gether. The law specifically prohibits courts from considering
the woman's promise to relinquish the child "as adverse to her
parental rights, status, or obligations."193 Whether by statute
or case law,194 many other states have adopted comparable
rules. 195
It is important to recognize that making a right inalienable
does not prevent people from making a contemporaneous deci-
sion to relinquish the right. In this sense, inalienability is dis-
tinct from waiver. To waive a right is to relinquish it "at the
time that the right could have been invoked."1 96 Alienating a
right, by contrast, "means promising now to waive a right in
the future."197 Thus, the fact that a woman, while pregnant,
may not alienate her right to maintain a relationship with her
child after birth does not mean that, after the child is born, the
woman cannot waive her right to a parent-child relationship by
consenting to an adoption. Similarly, making the right to de-
cide about the disposition of one's frozen embryos inalienable
the genetic parent of the resulting child. See generally NEW YORK STATE TASK
FORCE, supra note 3, at 84-85.
192. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1999). New York's surrogate
parenting law was proposed by the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law. For a comprehensive analysis of the rationale behind the law, see NEW
YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, SURROGATE PARENTING:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1988) [hereinafter
SURROGATE PARENTING].
193. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 124(1) (McKinney 1999).
194. Some courts have concluded that, even in the absence of specific leg-
islation on surrogate parenting, a surrogate mother's prebirth relinquishment
of parental rights is unenforceable because it conflicts with existing laws gov-
erning consent to adoption. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J.
1988).
195. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1998); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d
at 1242. Some states, however, have different rules for gestational surrogacy
situations. For example, in Florida, the law recognizes gestational surrogacy
as an exception to the rule that the birth mother is irrebutably presumed to be
the child's mother. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 1998).
196. Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate
Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1941 (1986).
197. Id.
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would not prevent individuals from consenting to the donation,
destruction, or research use of their embryos at the time those
decisions would actually be enforced. It would simply prevent
persons from being forced to adhere to advance commitments
regarding their embryos if they change their minds before the
disposition decision has been effectuated. 198
B. WHY INALIENABILITY?
Many of the reasons that underlie the law's characteriza-
tion of certain rights as inalienable apply to decisions about the
disposition of frozen embryos. 199 First, inalienable rights gen-
erally relate to deeply personal decisions that are central to
most people's identity and sense of self. Second, inalienable
rights limit the enforceability of promises made in situations
where it is particularly difficult to anticipate one's likely reac-
tion to future events. Third, inalienable rights often are cre-
ated to protect against the possibility of pressure, coercion, or
fraud. Finally, the decision to make a particular right inalien-
able reflects important societal values, including values about
families, reproduction, and the strength of genetic ties. Taken
together, these factors suggest that, like the examples of inal-
ienable rights set forth above, the right to consent or withhold
consent to the disposition of one's frozen embryos also should
be treated as an inalienable right.
1. Individual Identity
An important feature of inalienable rights is that they tend
to relate to deeply personal decisions that are central to most
people's identity and sense of self. For example, decisions
198. In this respect, inalienable rights are distinct from rights that can
never be relinquished, even contemporaneously. For example, persons may
not relinquish the right against involuntary servitude, regardless of whether
they do it contemporaneously or in advance. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-88 (1994).
199. In addition to the factors discussed in the text, some inalienable rights
also reflect considerations that are less applicable to decisions about the dispo-
sition of frozen embryos. For example, in the context of employment agree-
ments, "the right to substitute damages for the actual performance of the con-
tract is inalienable, and any agreement purporting to forfeit this entitlement
is invalid as a matter of law." Kronman, supra note 180, at 779. The inal-
ienability of the right to breach employment agreements and pay damages re-
flects concerns about involuntary servitude that are not applicable here.
Other inalienable rights that do not apply here, such as the right to vote, are
grounded in societal conceptions of the meaning of citizenship. See, e.g., Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 931, 961-63 (1985).
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about marriage are generally considered "central elements in
the identity of many people."2° The same is true for decisions
affecting the parent-child relationship, such as decisions about
whether to have a child or decisions to relinquish a child for
adoption. Because most decisions about these matters are con-
stitutionally protected,201 states must have a particularly
strong justification for interfering with the individual's choice.
The law respects people's choices about rights central to
individual identity because of the consequences to the individ-
ual of having these decisions subject to external control. A per-
son who is forced to marry someone she detests, or denied the
right to raise her biological offspring, is compelled to live in
conflict with her most basic values, desires, and beliefs. As Jed
Rubenfeld has argued in the context of the constitutional right
of privacy, it is the "pervasive, far-reaching, lifelong conse-
quences"20 2 of forcing individuals to conform to an externally-
imposed identity that underlies the law's protection of individ-
ual choice.203 The right to control personal decisions protects
people from being forced to deny who they are to conform to
someone else's sense of who they should be.
If rights central to individual identity are protected be-
cause of the consequences of being forced to live in conflict with
one's basic sense of self, it makes little sense to subordinate the
individual's current wishes to those expressed in the past.
What matters most is who she is at the time the decision will
be carried out, not who she was at some other time. Making
the right to control these decisions inalienable ensures that, as
a person's identity changes over time, she will not be forced to
live with the consequences of prior decisions that are no longer
consistent with the values and preferences of the person she
has become.
Like decisions about marriage or relinquishing a child for
adoption, decisions about the use of one's reproductive capacity
have lifelong consequences for a person's identity and sense of
200. Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited, supra note 196, at 1947.
201. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (right to main-
tain parent-child relationship); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)
(right to marry).
202. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739
(1989).
203. See id. at 784 (arguing that protecting a private sphere of individual
decision-making promotes "the fundamental freedom not to have one's life too
totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state").
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self. This is particularly true when the decision will lead to the
birth of a child. When chosen voluntarily, becoming a parent
can be an important act of self-definition. Compelled parent-
hood, by contrast, imposes an unwanted identity on the indi-
vidual, forcing her to redefine herself, her place in the world,
and the legacy she will leave after she dies. For some people,
the mandatory destruction of an embryo can have equally pro-
found consequences, particularly for those who believe that
embryos are persons. If forced destruction is experienced as
the loss of a child, it can lead to life-altering feelings of mourn-
ing, guilt, and regret.
If reproductive decisions are central to individual identity,
the premise of the contractual approach to the disposition of
frozen embryos-that enforcing the couple's prior consent re-
spects the partners' right to control the embryos' fate-over-
looks the underlying reason the couple's consent is required in
the first place. If the right to control disposition decisions is
protected because of the consequences to the partner whose
objections are ignored, respecting the partners' stake in the de-
cision should mean deferring to their views at the time those
consequences will actually occur. In the example above, where
the wife has undergone a fundamental transformation in val-
ues since the original agreement was made, it is the person the
wife has become-the one who objects to the donation of the
embryos-who will have to live as the involuntary parent of
genetic offspring whom she will never know. If her right to
control her reproductive capacity includes the right to avoid
having the identity of "parent" imposed on her against her will,
it is her current objection to donation, not her prior consent,
that matters the most.
2. Predicting the Impact of Life-Altering Events
Before entering into any contract, the parties must con-
sider how possible future events may affect their feelings about
adhering to the contract's terms. For example, if the market
price of a particular product drops dramatically, will the buyer
still be willing to pay the higher contract price? If the price
rises, how will the seller feel about adhering to the original
terms? The parties must assess the likely course of future
events as well as the severity of the consequences if their origi-
nal predictions prove wrong. In the ordinary contractual situa-
tion, it is assumed that the parties are capable of making these
assessments themselves. If their predictions are incorrect, the
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parties must nonetheless live with the consequences unless
they can establish that circumstances have changed so dra-
matically that, had the unforeseen developments been known
at the time the contract was made, both parties would have
agreed to substantially different terms.2°4
When a person makes a decision about an important indi-
vidual right, however, we care more about the quality of the
predictions on which the decision is based. For example, deci-
sions to relinquish constitutional rights must be "knowing" and
"intelligent,"20 5 a standard that does not apply to decisions to
buy a piece of property or sell a car.20 6 Because of the difficulty
of "predict[ing] and project[ing] a response to profound [human]
experiences that have not yet unfolded,"20 7 it may simply be
impossible to make a knowing and intelligent decision to relin-
quish a right in advance of the time the right is to be exercised.
This is particularly true in decisions about intensely emotional
matters, where people act more on the basis of feeling and in-
stinct than rational deliberation.20 8 Making the right to decide
about these matters inalienable-in other words, allowing peo-
ple to change their minds until a decision actually will be car-
ried out-ensures that decisions will be based on a greater ap-
preciation of the relevant facts. 209
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981); see also Angel
v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 636 (R.I. 1974).
205. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("Waivers of consti-
tutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."). See generally Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of
Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981).
206. Similarly, the law requires decisions about medical treatment to be
"informed," a standard that does not apply to ordinary commercial deals. See
generally THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 142-56 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing the principle of in-
formed consent).
207. SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 192, at 125.
208. Anthony Kronman argues that in situations "likely to be influenced by
strong and potentially distorting passions," individuals may be incapable of
exercising "moral imagination," defined as "the capacity to form an imagina-
tive conception of the moral consequences of a proposed course of action and to
anticipate its effect on one's character." Kronman, supra note 180, at 790, 796.
Individuals who are incapable of exercising moral imagination will not recog-
nize that their current choices "may one day seem antithetical to [their] deep-
est interests." Id. at 794. For this reason, the law often limits the enforce-
ability of promises made in these circumstances by imposing mandatory
cooling-off periods, such as rules requiring waiting periods before finalizing a
marriage or divorce. See id.
209. Protecting individuals from commitments based on uninformed pre-
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For many critics of surrogate parenting arrangements, it is
this difficulty of predicting the impact of life-altering future ex-
periences that makes enforcing a woman's agreement to serve
as a surrogate mother particularly unfair.210 In the Baby M.
case, for example, the court concluded that any attempt to re-
linquish parental rights before the experience of pregnancy and
childbirth is necessarily "uninformed" because the woman can-
not "know[] the strength of her bond with her child."21' "[In
areas of profound human feeling," one critic of surrogate par-
enting contracts writes, "you cannot promise because you can-
not know, and pretending otherwise would result in far more
misery than allowing people to cut their losses."212
Some supporters of the contractual approach to the dispo-
sition of frozen embryos acknowledge these concerns as applied
to preconception agreements to relinquish a child for adop-
tion 213 but argue that they do not apply to decisions about the
disposition of frozen embryos. John Robertson, for example,
dictions about future events is not the same as invalidating contracts because
of changed circumstances. The point is not that circumstances may change in
ways unforeseen by the parties at the time the contract was made. Rather, it
is that recognizing what might happen in the future does not mean that one
can appreciate how those circumstances would feel if the situation actually oc-
curs. Thus, the A.Z. court's reliance on the doctrine of changed circumstances
was misplaced. See A.Z. v. B.Z., No. 15-008-96, at 23-25 (Suffolk County Prob.
Ct., Mar. 25, 1996). In A.Z., the couple clearly contemplated that they might
someday have children, divorce, and then dispute the disposition of their re-
maining frozen embryos; in fact, that is why they entered into the disposition
agreement in the first place. See id. at 24. The point is not that they did not
contemplate the possibility of divorce; it is that they could not have appreci-
ated how they might feel about their embryos if a divorce actually occurred.
210. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Ar-
rangements, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 7, 13 (1988) ("Understandably, the
gestational mother's feelings may change once she has nurtured the fetus,
given birth to a human being whom she recognizes as part of herself and then
holds, cares for, and comes to love.").
211. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d. 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988).
212. Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, THE NATION, May 23,
1987, at 685.
213. See, e.g., Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 99, at 421. Robert-
son states:
Childbirth is such a major change in circumstances that one should
not reasonably be held to foresee how one arguably would feel about
child rearing until after birth has occurred. Having undergone the
physical rigors and bonding of pregnancy and childbirth, women may
have very different views about child rearing than when they made a
preconception agreement to relinquish the child for adoption. Ac-
cordingly, they should be free to disavow the relinquishment terms of
their prior contract.
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contends that the right to change one's mind about a precon-
ception promise to relinquish a child is grounded in "the in-
ability to foresee how one would feel after gestation and child-
birth."-2 14  Because "neither party will have undergone
pregnancy or similar burdens with frozen embryos," he main-
tains, concerns about predicting one's reaction to "the gesta-
tional and parturitive experience" do not apply.215
Robertson's argument, however, underestimates the poten-
tial impact of infertility and its treatment on an individual's
feelings about the use of embryos created with her gametes. A
person entering an IVF program for the first time, particularly
a person who has never had children, may find it difficult to
imagine what having genetic offspring will mean to her in the
future. Some people experiencing infertility may have gone to
great lengths to deny their feelings about the strength of ge-
netic relationships, especially if they are considering adoption
in addition to IVF.216 In some cases, their empathy with other
people experiencing infertility may lead them to agree to do-
nate any excess frozen embryos to other patients, a decision
they may regret profoundly once they understand what it
means to have genetically-related children of their own. In ad-
dition to changed feelings about the meaning of having genetic
offspring, persons who have become parents may worry about
the impact of donation on their existing children, who may be
burdened with the knowledge of having genetic siblings whom
they will never know.
Indeed, in cases where infertility treatment is successful,
the right to change one's mind about prior disposition decisions
stems from precisely the same concern that underlies the unen-
forceability of preconception agreements to relinquish a child
for adoption-the difficulty of predicting one's reaction to preg-
nancy and childbirth. The fact that an IVF patient will not be-
come pregnant with the specific embryos that are the subject of
the disposition agreement makes little difference. When an in-
dividual creates a cohort of embryos, using some to become
214. Id.
215. Id. at 422.
216. One survey found that over half of couples undergoing infertility
treatment had considered or were actively pursuing adoption. See SPR As-
socs. Inc., An Evaluation of Canadian Fertility Clinics: The Patient's Perspec-
tive, in ROYAL COMM'N ON NEW REPROD. TEcHS., 10 RESEARCH STUDIES OF
THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 123, 177-78
(1993).
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pregnant and freezing the rest, her experience of pregnancy
and childbirth is likely to influence her feelings about all of the
embryos, not simply the few that are actually transferred to her
womb. It is the experience of becoming a parent that is signifi-
cant; this experience has implications not only for the individ-
ual's relationship with any existing children but also for her
feelings about having children in the future or using her em-
bryos in any other way. Moreover, becoming a parent can have
as strong an impact on men as it does on women. It is not sim-
ply the physical experience of gestation and childbirth that
matters; it is the experience of having genetically-related off-
spring of one's own.
That is not to say that the difficulty of predicting the im-
pact of infertility treatment on one's feelings about the disposi-
tion of frozen embryos is limited to patients whose treatment is
successful. The intense emotions that accompany infertility
treatment--"an emotional roller coaster,"2 17 in the words of one
commentator-make predictions about the impact of unsuccess-
ful treatment equally problematic. Part of the problem is that
most patients enter into IVF with an overly optimistic sense of
their likelihood of success.218 Thus, patients may make ad-
vance disposition decisions on the assumption that they will
have had children of their own before any of the decisions will
ever be carried out. The consequences of these decisions may
feel quite different if treatment does not succeed. Donating
embryos to another person-in effect, allowing another person
to have the children the patient has been unable to have her-
self-may be particularly difficult to accept. Destroying the
embryos also may feel different than originally anticipated, as
it may symbolize the end to the patient's hopes for having ge-
217. BONNICKSEN, supra note 57, at 58. The emotional consequences of
unsuccessful treatment are particularly profound. See Mark D. Litt et al.,
Coping and Cognitive Factors in Adaptation to In Vitro Fertilization Failure,
15 J. BEHAV. MED. 171, 178 (1992) (finding that women who fail to become
pregnant in an IVF cycle often develop many symptoms of clinical depression,
including disturbed eating and sleeping habits and an inability to return to
work or engage in usual social activities).
218. See SPR Assocs. Inc., supra note 216, at 577 (finding that over half of
patients surveyed indicated that they were confident or very confident that
they would have a baby as a result of their treatment, even though 93 percent
of the patients had been told their likelihood of having a baby was 25 percent
or less); P. Slade et al., A Prospective, Longitudinal Study of Emotions and Re-
lationships in In-Vitro Fertilization Treatment, 12 HUM. REPROD. 183, 189
(1997) (finding that patients often overestimate their chances of success).
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netically-related children of her own.219 Likewise, patients who
have had a particularly bad experience with infertility treat-
ment may come to regret their decision to authorize the use of
their embryos in scientific research, particularly research on
IVF, as they may object to promoting a medical solution to in-
fertility instead of adoption or other approaches.
The difficulty of predicting one's future feelings about
cryopreserved embryos is compounded by the fact that disposi-
tion decisions may not be implemented for decades after the
embryos are created. There is simply not enough societal expe-
rience with the practice of embryo cryopreservation to presume
that most people's decisions about the disposition of their fro-
zen embryos will remain stable over such long periods of time.
In the absence of such experience, the law should err on the
side of greater flexibility, given the profoundly emotional na-
ture of the issues.
3. Pressure and Coercion
The concept of inalienability also is used as a response to
situations where pressure, coercion, or other illegitimate influ-
ences may lead people to relinquish rights they would actually
prefer to keep. In these situations, giving people the right to
change their minds protects them from being bound to prom-
ises that were extracted unfairly. The approach serves as a
prophylactic rule: it ensures that promises motivated by ille-
gitimate factors will not be enforced, even though doing so
means that those promises that are voluntary will be unen-
forceable as well.220
219. See BONNICKSEN, supra note 57, at 62 ("The embryo is a powerful
symbol of hope and, to some couples, the embryo may be the closest thing to
biological parenthood they have experienced.").
220. Anthony Kronman argues that, in some situations, absolute prohibi-
tions may be the only way to avoid coercion. See Kronman, supra note 180, at
777. Kronman states:
If we assume that in most cases a person would not contract into
slavery unless he were illegitimately compelled to do so, but that such
compulsion is difficult to detect and cannot easily be brought under
existing rules regarding duress and unconscionability, a flat prohibi-
tion against such agreements may be the only administratively feasi-
ble way of preventing illicit coercion.
Id. This argument also has been used to support prohibitions on physician-
assisted suicide. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-
Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
803, 836-48 (1995).
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Protection against pressure and coercion helps explain the
inalienability of a pregnant woman's promise to relinquish a
child for adoption. Allowing a woman to change her mind
about giving up her child for adoption "recognizes that circum-
stances may propel some women to make a decision before or
immediately after the birth of a child that does not reflect their
true wishes and the depth of the bond they feel to the child."221
For example, in Sullivan v. Mooney,222 in which the court in-
validated a teenage mother's prebirth agreement to relinquish
her child for adoption, the mother was told before she gave up
the child that she would be likely to harm the child if she kept
it and that if she got married, "no boy is going to want to take
that baby."223
Concerns about pressure and coercion also explain why the
doctrine of inalienability is sometimes applied in the context of
housing and consumer transactions. For example, a tenant
may not relinquish her right to insist that her landlord comply
with the implied warranty of habitability.224 A consumer may
not relinquish the contractual obligation to perform an agree-
ment in good faith,225 nor may she sign away the right to recon-
sider certain purchases if a legally-mandated "cooling-off' pe-
riod applies to the transaction.226 If the law permitted renters
and consumers to disclaim warranties of minimal quality, it is
likely that they would do so in many cases-not because they
are unconcerned about substandard housing or defective goods,
but because relinquishing these warranties would be a nonne-
gotiable requirement imposed by landlords and sellers. Refus-
ing to enforce decisions to relinquish these rights is an efficient
way to protect renters and consumers in a situation in which
their bargaining power is relatively weak.2 27
221. Alexander M. Capron & Margaret J. Radin, Choosing Family Law
over Contract Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 34, 35 (1988).
222. 407 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1981).
223. Id. at 560.
224. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
225. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1999) (imposing obligation of good faith); see id.
§ 1-102(3) (providing that obligation of good faith "may not be disclaimed by
agreement").
226. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1999) (requiring three-day cooling off period
for door-to-door consumer sales).
227. Anthony Kronman characterizes such prophylactic rules as "an effi-
ciency-enhancing adjunct to the fraud remedy a disappointed tenant would
have were the warranty freely disclaimable." Kronman, supra note 180, at
766.
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In the context of decisions about the disposition of frozen
embryos, there is an inherently coercive aspect of a rule that
makes signing an advance agreement a condition of undergoing
treatment with IVF. In essence, the contractual approach
turns the couple's most personal decisions about how their re-
productive capacity will be used into a nonnegotiable clause in
a contract of adhesion.228 While it is unlikely that a physician
would condition treatment on a patient's consent to a particular
disposition option ("Agree to let me use your excess embryos in
my research projects or I won't treat you"), the fact that pa-
tients are required to make binding disposition decisions or
forgo treatment entirely puts pressure on patients to commit to
something, even if they are unsure of what their preferences in
the future are likely to be.229
It also is significant that this pressure to commit to future
reproductive decisions is limited to individuals who are unable
to reproduce without IVF. Fertile couples are free to change
their minds about decisions to have, or not to have, additional
children, or to donate their reproductive material to other per-
sons or to scientific research. Making the right to decide about
the disposition of one's frozen embryos inalienable extends this
same protection to persons whose reproductive options depend
on the availability of IVF.
4. Societal Values
Finally, inalienable rights reflect and promote important
societal values. The law's unwillingness to enforce promises af-
fecting the marital relationship or a pregnant woman's promise
to sever her relationship with her child after birth promotes so-
cietal conceptions about the nature of family relationships and
the strength of genetic ties. In the context of adoption and sur-
rogate parenting agreements, the rejection of a contractual ap-
proach also reflects concerns about the commodification of chil-
dren and the reproductive process. Requiring couples to enter
228. See Diamond, supra note 8, at 94 ("IVF contracts, like insurance con-
tracts, may be viewed as contracts of adhesion, wherein the gamete donors
may be forced to accept the unfavorable contract terms the IVF facility offers,
or be left with the alternative of having no IVF treatment at all."). The term
"contract of adhesion" refers to take-it-or-leave-it standard form contracts
"under which the only alternative to complete adherence is outright rejection."
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 295 (2d ed. 1982).
229. Or they may decide not to pursue treatment at all. See BONNICKSEN,
supra note 57, at 41 ("The agreements have been known to overwhelm and
turn away couples wary about IVF in the first place.").
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into binding contracts about the disposition of their frozen em-
bryos would undermine these important societal goals.
Among the most important values that inalienability pro-
tects are those related to the nature of family relationships.
Family relationships, unlike marketplace transactions, are ex-
pected to be based on commitments whose force is rooted in af-
fection and a sense of mutual responsibility, not the threat of
legal liability.230 Indeed, that family members will generally
honor their promises to one another without legal compulsion is
part of what makes family relationships so valuable to most
people.23' Thus, people tend not to turn to the law to enforce
intrafamilial promises;232 when they do, courts are usually re-
luctant to get involved. 233 The marriage vows themselves are
not treated like binding contracts; couples may end their mar-
riage despite an advance agreement to remain together for
life.234
While there has been a trend in recent years toward
treating the marital relationship more like a contract,235 courts
still do not treat agreements between married couples like or-
dinary commercial deals. For example, while couples contem-
plating marriage may dictate the disposition of property after
divorce through prenuptial agreements, courts may decline to
enforce the agreement if it is not substantively fair.236 Moreo-
230. See Moskowitz, supra note 8, at A25 ("[Clontracts are commercial
tools, at odds with the unconditional, binding qualities many individuals value
about family relationships."). But cf Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983)
(criticizing the sharp distinction between the "altruism" of the family and the
"individualism" of the market).
231. See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciproc-
ity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 557 (1999) ("[T]he perform-
ance is valuable, in large measure, because it is motivated, or appears to be
motivated, by love rather than self-interest.").
232. See id. ("[Flamily members do not look to the law because doing so
would destroy the family relationship.").
233. See Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 39, 40 (1992) (noting the reluctance of courts to enforce family prom-
ises).
234. See Scott & Scott, supra note 186, at 1230 ("Under the no-fault re-
gime, the law does not enforce the explicit promises of the marriage partners
(the wedding vows); nor does it enforce promises about conduct during the
marriage.").
235. See generally Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Mar-
riage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982).
236. See, e.g., Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 551-52 (Wis. 1986) (hold-
ing that a premarital agreement may be set aside if enforcing it would be un-
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ver, despite the legality of such agreements, many people still
look at contracts between married couples with considerable
disfavor. As Carl Schneider has observed, "the whole contrac-
tual approach will seem to many families (and possibly should
seem to the law) inimical to good family relations. 2 37
The contractual approach to questions surrounding the
disposition of frozen embryos embodies a conception of family
relationships that society should be particularly reluctant to
embrace. It is one thing for couples to assume the role of arms-
length negotiators when deciding about the division of property
in the event of divorce. A couple beginning infertility treat-
ment, however, is embarking on the creation of a family. Deci-
sions about having children should be made in the spirit of
trust and mutual cooperation, not as part of a negotiated deal
backed by the force of law. Requiring partners to contract with
each other about their future reproductive plans dehumanizes
the process by treating it like a business transaction rather
than an expression of love. As Alexander Capron has argued,
"[c]ontracts are a fine way to make binding agreements about
the disposition of property, but they are much less appropriate
when deciding about personal relationships, especially ones
like joint parenthood that would be purely hypothetical at the
time that a couple undergoing IVF would sign the contract."238
Inalienability also reflects societal judgments about the
strength of connections based on genetic bonds.239 The right to
change one's mind about relinquishing a child for adoption, for
example, "manifests society's traditional respect for biological
fair, even if the agreement appeared fair at the time it was made). States that
have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, however, will enforce
prenuptial agreements according to general principles of contract law, except
for provisions affecting children. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT, 9B
U.L.A. 369 (1973).
237. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of Ameri-
can Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1832 (1985); see also Shultz, supra
note 235, at 242 ("Contract involves careful planning of future rights and obli-
gations; many think of marriage as an unpredictable unfolding subject to the
trial and complexity of constantly changing circumstances, and partaking of
the joy of human spontaneity.").
238. Capron, supra note 8, at 33.
239. Some commentators, however, maintain that society's strong respect
for genetic relationships has negative racial undertones. See Dorothy E. Rob-
erts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 244 (1995) ("New reproductive
technologies are so popular in American culture not simply because of the
value placed on the genetic tie, but because of the value placed on the white
genetic tie.").
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ties. 2 40 By making it more difficult to give up a child, inal-
ienability is consistent with other legal rules that discourage
the termination of parental rights.241 These rules are based on
society's respect for the rights of biological parents, 242 as well as
an interest in encouraging parents to assume responsibility for
the children they produce.243
Making decisions about the disposition of one's frozen em-
bryos inalienable would serve similar goals. Allowing people to
change their minds about disposition decisions would show re-
spect for the bonds people feel toward their genetic progeny,
both existing offspring and the possibility of future offspring
that frozen embryos represent. By tipping the scales in favor of
those who choose not to allow the use of their embryos by
someone else, an inalienable rights approach also would pro-
mote the value of parental responsibility. In a world where too
many people abdicate their obligations to care for their chil-
dren,244 a person who is unwilling to become a parent without
raising the child herself should be supported in her decision.
That a person could be absolved of the legal and financial obli-
gations of biological parenthood is not an adequate response.
For some people, it may be impossible to have genetic offspring
and remain indifferent to their predicament. Such people
should be commended for their sense of responsibility, not
forced to suppress their feelings of parental responsibility be-
cause of a prior agreement they no longer support.
Finally, the law's reluctance to enforce contracts related to
the parent-child relationship reflects aversion to the commodi-
fication of children and the reproductive process. Concerns
about the commodification of children are most often applied to
practices, like baby selling or commercial surrogate parenting
240. Capron & Radin, supra note 221, at 35.
241. An individual's parental rights may not be terminated involuntarily
without clear and convincing evidence of unfitness. See Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 769 (1981).
242. The Supreme Court has held that biological fathers have a limited
constitutional right to establish a relationship with their offspring, see Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983), as long as the child's mother is not
married to another man, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30
(1989).
243. Biological parents have a legal obligation to support their minor chil-
dren. See, e.g., N.Y. FAAHLY COURT ACT § 513 (McKinney 1999).
244. See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, The Government's Role in the Support of
Children, 11 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 55, 55-56 (1997) (noting that "[miore than half
of all children potentially eligible for child support receive nothing from their
biological fathers").
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arrangements, that directly threaten to create a market in
children or "reproductive services. 2 45 Such practices are wrong
because they treat children as products whose value is based on
their cost and perceived quality, rather than as individuals
with their own intrinsic worth.246 Yet, it is not the exchange of
money per se that creates the risk of commodification but the
application of the rules of marketplace transactions to funda-
mental decisions about a child's fate. The idea that "a deal's a
deal," when applied to decisions about the custody of a child,
treats the parent-child relationship like an ownership interest
in property rather than a human connection between two living
beings.
Even though most people agree that embryos do not have
the moral status of children,247 there is a broad consensus that
the commodification of embryos is nonetheless wrong.248 Part
of the problem is that "the line between selling babies and
selling embryos is not sharp and distinct."249 If it is wrong to
put a price on the value of a child, the same should be true for
putting a price on the genetic material that will lead to the
child's birth.250 In addition, treating embryos like market
commodities undermines the dignity of the reproductive proc-
ess by turning the act of procreation into the manufacture of a
product, rather than the expression of a commitment between
245. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1921-36 (1987).
246. See id. at 1885 ("In our understanding of personhood we are commit-
ted to an ideal of individual uniqueness that does not cohere with the idea that
each person's attributes are fungible, that they have a monetary equivalent,
and that they can be traded off against those of other people.").
247. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
249. Ruth Macklin, What Is Wrong with Commodification?, in NEW WAYS
OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 106, 115 (Cynthia B. Cohen
ed., 1996).
250. For these reasons, many states have laws prohibiting the purchase
and sale of sperm and eggs. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (1998); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4364(5) (McKinney Supp. 1999). Direct payments for
gametes also are discouraged by most ethicists and professional organizations.
See, e.g., American Fertility Society, supra note 70, at 4S. However, payment
for the time, inconvenience, or other expenses associated with donation is gen-
erally considered acceptable. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3,
at 254-58. This rationale has been used to justify increasingly high payments
to egg donors. See Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10 (reporting one couple's offer of $50,000 for
eggs from a tall young woman with high SAT scores).
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two human beings.251 Finally, the commodification of embryos
is wrong for the same reason the commodification of organs or
other bodily products is not accepted in our society:252 it treats
the human body itself as a market commodity, which has dan-
gerous implications for the way that all persons are viewed.253
The danger that treating decisions about the disposition of em-
bryos as binding contracts would contribute to the perception of
embryos as commodities is another reason to reject the contrac-
tual approach.
V. THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS APPROACH IN PRACTICE
Drawing on a proposal developed by the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law, this Part explains how an in-
alienable right to mutual consent would work in practice. The
approach set forth below is grounded in respect for the individ-
ual's right to make contemporaneous decisions about the use of
his or her reproductive capacity, as well as concern for IVF pro-
grams' need for clear and easily administered rules. Depending
on the circumstances of a particular jurisdiction, the approach
could be adopted through legislation, administrative regula-
tions, or judicial decision.254
251. See Annas et al., supra note 61, at 1331 ("[Als a society we do not want
to see embryos treated as products or as mere objects, for fear that we will
cheapen the value of parenting, risk commercializing procreation, and trivial-
ize the act of procreation."); cf SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 192, at 121
(arguing that the characterization of gestation as a "service" does damage to
"the values and meanings associated with human reproduction" which "are
derived from the relationship between the mother and father of a child and the
child's creation as an expression of their mutual love").
252. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West 1998) (listing body parts that may not be
sold). See generally Mark F. Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation:
From Where Will New Donors Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 249, 294-301 (1995) (outlining arguments against developing
a market in organs).
253. See Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price
of Progress, 107 PUB. INTEREST 65, 83 (1992) ("[If we come to think about our-
selves like pork bellies, pork bellies we will become."). Other concerns about
developing a market in organs include the risk that poor people will be ex-
ploited, the potential impact on the quality of organs obtained, and fears of "a
devastating effect on an important altruistic institution in our society." An-
derson, supra note 252, at 299.
254. Legislation or regulations would be required in states like New York
and Tennessee, where judicial decisions already have endorsed the contractual
approach. See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text. The New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law recommended a regulatory approach to these
issues. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 313-26. Other is-
sues regarding the storage and disposition of frozen gametes and embryos are
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A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The starting point for the approach proposed in this section
is the principle of mutual consent set forth in Part III. Ac-
cording to that principle, no embryo should be used by either
partner, donated to another patient, used in research, or de-
stroyed without the mutual consent of the couple that created
the embryo. An objection by either partner must be honored,
even if that person consented to the decision in question in the
past.
Even though advance disposition agreements would not be
binding under an inalienable rights approach, the process of
leaving advance instructions would still play an important role.
Having advance instructions on file would ensure that if both
partners die or lose contact with the storage facility, the facility
would know how the couple would have wanted the embryos to
be disposed. 255 In addition, the process of leaving advance in-
structions will force the couple to consider carefully the impli-
cations of creating multiple embryos, including the possibility
that they may create more embryos than they ever will use.
The essence of the inalienable rights approach to disposi-
tion decisions is that advance instructions would not be treated
as binding contracts. If either partner has a change of mind
about disposition decisions made in advance, that person's cur-
rent objection would take precedence over the prior consent. If
already addressed through regulations in New York State. See id. at 412.
255. When a couple loses contact with the facility and has not left an ad-
vance agreement, the embryos may be considered "abandoned." The American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has concluded:
[Ilt is ethically acceptable for a program to consider embryos to have
been abandoned if more than five years have passed since contact
with a couple, diligent efforts have been made by telephone and regis-
tered mail to contact the couple... and no written instruction from
the couple exists concerning disposition.
Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra
note 109, at IS. According to the ASRM, abandoned embryos may be dis-
carded, but they should not be used for research or donated to other couples.
See id. The first reported case involving abandoned embryos involved the Rio-
ses, an American couple who died in an airplane crash after leaving two em-
bryos frozen in an Australian facility. In response to concerns about the fate
of the embryos, the State of Victoria enacted legislation providing that the
Rios' embryos should be implanted in a surrogate and then placed for adop-
tion. See George P. Smith, II, Australia's Frozen "Orphan" Embryos: A Medi-
cal, Legal, and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27, 38 (1985-1986). Subse-
quently, a committee formed by the Victorian government recommended that
embryos abandoned with no advance instructions should be discarded. See id.
at 37.
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one of the partners rescinds an advance disposition decision
and the other does not, the mutual consent principle would not
be satisfied and the previously agreed-upon disposition decision
could not be carried out.256
The fact that individuals are entitled to change their minds
about disposition decisions does not mean that storage facilities
would have an obligation to ascertain whether instructions set
forth in advance planning documents continue to reflect the
partners' views. The process of leaving advance instructions
would serve little purpose if storage facilities could not rely on
them without confirming their continued validity. The burden,
therefore, should be on the person who changes her mind to no-
tify the storage facility that she has rescinded her prior deci-
sion. Unless the facility receives such notice, it should be enti-
tled to rely on disposition decisions expressed in advance.257 As
part of the process of obtaining informed consent to embryo
cryopreservation, storage facilities should inform individuals of
their obligation to notify the facility of any change of mind.
The critical issue, of course, is determining what should
happen to the embryos when the partners no longer agree to a
disposition decision made in advance. Ideally, the partners will
be able to agree to a second-choice disposition decision, thereby
avoiding an irreconcilable conflict. For example, if they previ-
ously agreed to donate their excess embryos to another patient
and one partner has changed her mind because she does not
want to become a parent, the couple may agree that the em-
bryos should be destroyed. In some cases, however, the couple
256. For practical purposes, the right to change one's mind about disposi-
tion decisions ends once a disposition decision is actually implemented. The
destruction of an embryo obviously cannot be undone, nor can the use of an
embryo by another patient. In some cases, however, carrying out a disposition
decision may involve more than a single, discrete event. For example, if a
couple agrees to donate nine embryos to another patient, and only four are
used in the recipient's initial cycle, what is the status of the remaining five?
The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law proposed that, in such
situations, the process of donating the remaining five embryos would not be
complete, and the partners would retain the right to revoke their consent. See
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 324-25. The donation would
not be irrevocable until a specific patient has begun the process of hormonal
preparation in reliance on the availability of the couple's embryos. See id. at
325.
257. In some cases, it might be reasonable to place a minimal notice re-
quirement on storage facilities. For example, if one partner seeks to use the
embryos in the absence of the other partner, it might make sense for facilities
to send the partner who is not present a registered letter at his or her last
known address.
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may not be able to agree to any disposition decision. One part-
ner, for example, may have agreed to donate the embryos to
another patient because he objects to the destruction of em-
bryos on moral grounds and believes that the embryos are per-
sons and deserve a chance to be brought to term, whereas the
other partner may be insistent that the embryos be destroyed.
When the couple is unable to agree to any disposition deci-
sion, the most appropriate solution is to keep the embryos
where they are-in frozen storage. Unlike the other possible
disposition decisions-use by one partner, donation to another
patient, donation to research, or destruction-keeping the em-
bryos frozen is not final and irrevocable. By preserving the
status quo, it makes it possible for the partners to reach an
agreement at a later time. Moreover, while some people may
find the indefinite storage of frozen embryos unsettling, contin-
ued cryopreservation does not violate either partner's right to
decide whether the embryos will actually be used.
In practice, the embryos will be kept frozen indefinitely
only if at least one of the partners is opposed to the destruction
of human embryos. Otherwise, in the absence of mutual con-
sent to the use or donation of the embryos, the most likely re-
sult is that the couple will agree to have the embryos destroyed.
Given that the default rule of continued storage benefits the
partner who opposes destruction, it seems appropriate for that
partner to shoulder the burden of paying for storage. The right
to insist on the continued storage of the embryos should be de-
pendent on a willingness to pay the associated costs.
The fact that either partner may insist on the continued
storage of the embryos does not create an obligation for any
storage facility to become a long-term repository for frozen em-
bryos. In this sense, the right to preserve the embryos indefi-
nitely is analogous to the right to obtain an abortion: it is a
right to choose this option free from state interference, not a
right to compel the services of any particular provider.258 Thus,
facilities should be free to set limits on the time they will store
frozen embryos, provided those limits are made clear to the
couple at the time the embryo is initially stored. When the
limits expire, the partner who wishes to keep the embryos fro-
258. Cf N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney 1999) (authorizing health
care providers to refuse to perform or assist in abortions).
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zen indefinitely would have the option of transferring them to
another facility.259
B. WHEN ONE PARTNER DIES, DISAPPEARS, OR LOSES
DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY
When one of the parties is no longer able to indicate an
opinion about the disposition of the embryos, whether because
of death, disappearance, or loss of decision-making capacity,
the law should respect the most recent expression of that per-
son's wishes. For example, if both partners agreed to donate
their excess embryos to another patient and one of the partners
dies, the surviving partner could carry out the previous agree-
ment as long as there is no evidence that the deceased partner
changed his mind after the agreement was made. However, if
the decedent made it clear that he did not want the embryos to
be used, the surviving partner should not have the right to do-
nate the embryos simply because the decedent is no longer
available to express his objection directly.
It might be argued that once a person dies, her interest in
controlling the fate of the embryos is no longer entitled to legal
protection, especially when the decedent's previously-expressed
wishes conflict with those of the surviving partner.260 However,
the right to control the use of one's embryos after death is at
least as important as the right to direct the posthumous dispo-
sition of one's property, which society has historically recog-
nized through the enforcement of wills.2 61 As the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law observed, "[tihese rights
are important not because deceased persons have independent
interests deserving of legal protection, but because living peo-
ple benefit from the knowledge that their instructions will be
respected after they die."2 62
259. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
260. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 1047 ("Because the survivor's current
reproductive interests could reasonably be deemed more important than the
right to control posthumous reproduction, a state might wish to allow the sur-
vivor's reproductive choice to control, despite her prior agreement with the de-
ceased.").
261. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Post-
humous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 943 (1997) ("[Ilt would be ironic in-
deed if the law were to protect pre-mortem wishes regarding the disposition of
property, but ignore pre-mortem wishes concerning a matter as central to a
person's identity as the desire not to create another human being.").
262. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 321; cf Nancy K.
Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845, 864 (1990)
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At the same time, there may be exceptional cases where
the surviving partner has a compelling reason to depart from
the deceased partner's previously-expressed disposition in-
structions. For example, the Task Force on Life and the Law
posited a case where one of the partners and all of the couple's
children are killed in an accident. In such circumstances, the
surviving partner may feel that the deceased partner, if alive to
state his views, would agree that his original decision to de-
stroy the remaining embryos should no longer be followed so
that the surviving partner could have the opportunity to start a
new family. To deal with these exceptional cases, the Task
Force proposed that courts have the authority to override the
decedent's prior instructions upon a showing of extraordinary
circumstances. 263 Such an approach, which is analogous to the
contractual doctrine of changed circumstances, 26 would avoid
making the surviving partner a captive of the decedent's last
known views.
C. EMBRYOS CREATED WITH DONOR SPERM AND/OR DONOR
EGGS
The approach proposed in this article, as well as the cases
and commentary outlined in Part II, are intended to deal with
the typical IVF scenario, in which a couple creates embryos by
fertilizing the female partner's eggs with the male partner's
sperm. In some cases, however, couples may create embryos by
combining one partner's gametes with those of a donor.265 Cou-
ples may use donor gametes for a variety of reasons, including
medical conditions that make it difficult or impossible for one of
the partners to provide gametes,266 concerns about transmitting
genetic conditions or HIV,267 or, in the case of donor eggs, the
("[L]iving persons can have rights of future performance, and that breaches of
duties to perform after death count as wrongs to the right-holder, thought of
as she was when alive.").
263. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 321.
264. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
265. For a discussion of the sources of donor gametes, see NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 235-45.
266. Donor sperm may be used as a response to "several types of male in-
fertility, including an irreversible lack of sperm or extremely low sperm count,
severely impaired sperm shape and motility, inability to ejaculate, or obstruc-
tion of the reproductive tract." NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3,
at 74. Donor eggs are offered to women who lack functioning ovaries or
women who have not achieved pregnancy through IVF. See id. at 77.
267. See id. at 74, 77.
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woman's advanced age.268 Less frequently, a couple will create
embryos with both donor sperm and donor eggs, i.e., without
any genetic material from the partners themselves. This may
occur when a couple plans to use donor eggs and the male part-
ner's sperm, but the man is unable to provide a usable sperm
sample at the time the eggs are scheduled to be fertilized.269
Alternatively, couples in which both partners are unable to
produce gametes may deliberately seek to create embryos with
donor sperm and donor eggs in order to have more control over
their child's genetic characteristics than they would if they
used an embryo left over from another couple's infertility
treatment or if they adopted an existing child.270
When couples create an embryo with either donor sperm or
donor eggs, only one of the partners will be the genetic parent
of any child who results from the implantation of the embryos.
When both donor sperm and donor eggs are used, neither part-
ner will be a genetic parent. Because an individual who lacks a
genetic connection to an embryo has a lesser stake in how the
embryo is disposed, the resolution of disputes over the disposi-
tion of embryos created with donor sperm and/or eggs requires
a different set of rules than those that apply to disputes over
embryos created with both partners' gametes.
This does not mean that the principle of mutual consent
set forth in Part III has no applicability to embryos created
with donor sperm and/or eggs. If the couple that created the
embryos is married, there are strong reasons for giving both
partners equivalent decision-making rights. Even if one or
both of the partners will not be the genetic parent of a child
who results from the implantation of the embryo, both partners
are potential legal parents if the embryos are implanted in the
woman and a child is born.271 Because the use of the embryos
268. See id. at 77.
269. Some men are unable to produce semen samples on demand, particu-
larly in a medical setting. See Janet L. Blenner, Stress and Mediators: Pa-
tients' Perceptions of Infertility Treatment, NURSING REs., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at
92, 94-95.
270. See Gina Kolata, Clinics Selling Embryos Made for "Adoption", N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, at Al.
271. In some states, the law expressly provides that a woman who gives
birth to a child is the child's mother, even if the child was conceived with an-
other woman's egg. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 1998); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-18-04 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 555 (1998); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 151.102 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie. 1998 &
Supp. 1999); see also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION
ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 191 (1988) (providing that a woman who gives birth to a
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implicates both partners' potential parental rights and respon-
sibilities, they both should have a say in how the embryos are
used.
However, if the couple divorces or was never married to
begin with, the interests of the partner whose gametes were not
used are much weaker. If the embryos were created with donor
sperm and are used by the woman after the couple divorces, the
man will not be considered the legal father of any child who re-
sults. 272 Likewise, if the embryos were created with the man's
sperm and donor eggs, the woman would not have any rights or
responsibilities if the embryos are used by the man with an-
other wife or partner.273 In such circumstances, the partner
whose gametes were used to create the embryos should have
exclusive decision-making authority over disposition decisions,
as that partner is the only one whose right to choose whether or
not to become a parent is at stake.274
When embryos are created with donor sperm or eggs and
one partner dies, disappears, or loses decision-making capacity,
the other partner's right to control disposition decisions should
depend on which partner's gametes were used to create the
embryo. If the remaining partner has no genetic connection to
the embryo, the final disposition decision expressed by the ab-
sent partner should generally control. If, by contrast, it was
the surviving partner whose gametes were used, that person
child is the child's mother except when the woman is acting as a surrogate in a
state where surrogate parenting contracts are legally enforceable). If the
woman is married, her husband will probably be considered the child's father
based on the common law presumption of legitimacy. See, e.g., State ex rel. H.
v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (App. Div. 1982) (describing the presumption of
legitimacy as "one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law")
(quoting In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930)).
272. There would be no grounds for declaring paternity because the man
would lack both a biological connection to the child and a marital relationship
to the child's mother.
273. In such cases, the woman would lack either a genetic or gestational
relationship to the child.
274. Of course, there is another person who has a stake in how the embryos
are used in these situations-the gamete donor. However, giving gamete do-
nors the right to control decisions about the disposition of embryos created
with their gametes would be impractical, as most donors have no way of
knowing what happens to their gametes after the donation is complete. See
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 286 (arguing that donors
should not have a right to learn whether the donation resulted in a pregnancy
or live birth). Moreover, it would be difficult to give donors this knowledge
without compromising the confidentiality of the donor process, something that
both donors and recipients might be unwilling to accept. See id. at 363-67
(discussing donor confidentiality).
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should have full decision-making authority over the use of any
remaining embryos.
The creation of embryos with both donor sperm and donor
eggs raises different issues. During marriage, it seems appro-
priate to require the couple's mutual consent to disposition de-
cisions for the same reason mutual consent should be required
when embryos are created with donor sperm or donor eggs-
both partners' rights and responsibilities as legal parents are at
stake. However, if the couple divorces or never was married,
neither partner has a significant stake in the disposition of the
embryos, given the absence of either a genetic connection to the
embryos or legal responsibility for any child who results. With-
out any reason to favor either partner over the other, there is
considerable room for flexibility in the development of legal
rules. The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law
recommended that either partner should have the right to use
the embryos to have a child, regardless of an objection by the
other partner.275 However, if neither partner wishes to use the
embryos, a partner who seeks continued storage should prevail
over one who wishes to donate or destroy the embryos, as dona-
tion or destruction would deny the partner who wishes to main-
tain the embryos the right to use them for him or herself in the
future. Another approach might be to divide the embryos
equally, allowing each partner to do whatever he or she wants
without regard to the other's views, or to give all of the embryos
to the partner with the predominant factor of infertility.
VI. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS
Several objections are likely to be raised in response to this
inalienable rights approach to disposition decisions. First, it
might be argued that the ability to make commitments about
future events is itself an important freedom, which is under-
mined by recognizing a right to change one's mind. Second, de-
nying couples the right to make binding agreements about the
disposition of their frozen embryos, it might be claimed, can be
justified only by the paternalistic premise that individuals need
to be protected from the consequences of their own choices.
Third, allowing either partner to change her mind might be
criticized for insufficiently valuing the interests of the partner
who has acted in reliance on a disposition decision agreed to in
advance. Fourth, supporters of the contractual approach may
275. See id. at 323-24.
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ask why advance disposition agreements should not be enforced
when other advance planning devices, such as living wills, have
such widespread support. Finally, those who support the con-
tractual approach to disposition decisions are likely to chal-
lenge the practicality of a rule that allows disposition agree-
ments to be rescinded at will.
A. THE RIGHT To MAKE COMMITMENTS
One possible argument against the inalienable rights ap-
proach to disposition decisions is that it disregards the individ-
ual's interest in making binding commitments about future
events. Although "freedom of contract" is no longer recognized
as a constitutional right,276 the ability to enter into binding
agreements is nonetheless thought to be an important part of
individual liberty. As Thomas Schelling argues, "[f]ull freedom
entails the freedom to bind oneself, to incur obligation, to re-
duce one's range of choice."277
The right to make binding decisions is regarded as impor-
tant for at least three reasons. First, in some cases, individuals
may want to make enforceable commitments to protect their
long-term interests against a possible short-term lapse of
judgment or "weakness of will."278 The classic example of this
is Ulysses' request to be tied to the mast of his ship so that he
could hear the song of the Sirens without being tempted from
staying his course. 279
276. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish Co., 300 U.S. 379, 391-400 (1937)
(upholding minimum wage legislation and marking an end to the Supreme
Court's protection of freedom of contract).
277. Thomas C. Schelling, CHOICE & CONSEQUENCE 98 (1984); see also
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 13 (1981). Fried states:
In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the greatest
possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is neces-
sary that there be a way in which I may commit myself. It is neces-
sary that I be able to make non-optional a course of conduct that
would otherwise be optional for me.
Id.
278. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF
REGRETTED DECISIONS 10 (1998).
279. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 210-11 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Anchor
Books ed., 1963). More recently, some commentators have proposed statutes
authorizing individuals with certain mental illnesses to enter into agreements
authorizing their physicians to ignore subsequent disease-induced refusals of
psychiatric medications. See, e.g., Roberto Cuca, Note, Ulysses in Minnesota:
First Steps Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric Advance Directives Statute, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 1152, 1163-65 (1993). These commentators argue that,
during periods of lucidity, persons with mental illness have a right to protect
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The second, and perhaps more common, reason is that the
ability to commit oneself to a future course of action allows
people to influence others to do the same. If promises could be
made and broken at will, agreements in which one party
promises to do something in exchange for a promise by the
other would be worthless. Individuals could not borrow money
or buy on credit, for example, if they could simply change their
minds about their promise to repay.280 As Charles Fried has
argued, "[i]f it is my purpose, my will that others be able to
count on me in the pursuit of their endeavor, it is essential that
I be able to deliver myself into their hands more firmly than
where they simply predict my future course."2 81
Third, in some cases people may want to make binding
commitments so that they can have greater certainty about
what the future will bring. Certainty about the future can fa-
cilitate the process of making plans. In addition, for some peo-
ple, predictability-and the sense of security that accompanies
it-is an important value in its own right.
None of these reasons for respecting individual commit-
ments, however, undermines the inalienability argument as
applied to decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos.
First, people do not sign advance disposition agreements be-
cause they want to protect their long-term interests against a
future "weakness of will."282 Few couples have such strong be-
liefs in the importance of donating their embryos to other pa-
tients, for example, that they enter into disposition agreements
to protect themselves from an uncontrollable desire to use the
embryos another way. If anything, decisions made before the
embryos are created are less likely than future decisions to re-
flect the couple's long-term interests; before treatment begins
the couple has little way of knowing how they will feel about
the embryos once they exist.283
It also is unlikely that the ability to commit to future dis-
position decisions will be necessary for one partner to convince
the other to undergo IVF. Most people seek infertility treat-
their long-term interests against harmful choices they may make in the fu-
ture. See id. at 1185 (arguing that allowing patients to provide binding ad-
vance consent to psychiatric treatment "increases the patient's control of her
own life and reduces the cost of her illness to both herself and society").
280. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 278, at 14.
281. FRIED, supra note 277, at 13.
282. FARNSWORTH, supra note 278, at 10.
283. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
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ment because they want to have children, not as consideration
for their partner's agreement to dispose of their excess embryos
in a particular way. Indeed, most couples are probably not
even aware that they may have to make decisions about their
frozen embryos in the future until the IVF program brings the
issue to their attention. Even if some people would not undergo
IVF without the ability to insist on a particular disposition de-
cision-for example, a woman who says that she will not un-
dergo ovarian stimulation without a guarantee that she can use
all of the resulting embryos, even if she and her husband di-
vorce-such situations should not be regarded as the norm. In
the commercial context, it is reasonable to assume that the le-
gal enforceability of commitments is necessary to encourage co-
operative activity between persons whose relationship is based
primarily on economic self-interest. For couples about to have
a child, however, the presumption should be that the relation-
ship is guided by trust and a willingness to accommodate each
other's changing views.
Finally, while some people may want to enter into binding
disposition agreements because they hope to have greater cer-
tainty about what the future will bring, the desire for certainty
should not take precedence over every other interest at stake.
In most other areas of reproduction and family life, certainty is
not a value the law generally protects. If people can change
their minds about whether to get married, to stay married, to
have children through coital reproduction, or to give up their
children for adoption, 284 there is no reason to give greater pri-
ority to certainty in the context of IVF.
B. PATERNALISM
A second objection to the inalienable rights approach is
that it rests on the paternalistic assumption that people need to
be protected from the consequences of their own choices. This
argument is often raised against laws that deny enforcement to
surrogate parenting contracts. Lori Andrews, for example,
claims that "[lit would seem to be a step backward for women to
argue that they are incapable of making decisions. That, after
all, was the rationale for so many legal principles oppressing
women for so long. 285 Inalienability, in this view, infantalizes
284. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
285. Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists,
in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 205, 211 (Kenneth D. Alpern
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those who seek to relinquish a right by denying that they are
capable of taking their long-term interests into account.
At one level, the objection based on paternalism simply
misses the point of the inalienability approach. Paternalism
involves limitations on an individual's autonomy for the benefit
of the person whose autonomy is constrained.286 To the extent
that inalienability is designed to advance broader societal in-
terests-for example, the interest in promoting family relation-
ships based on trust, or the interest in showing respect for the
strength of genetic ties-the paternalism argument is irrele-
vant because the goal is not to protect the rights of the indi-
viduals in any particular case.28 7
More importantly, the characterization of inalienability as
paternalistic does not, in itself, undermine the argument for
allowing people to change their minds. Although it is often as-
sumed that paternalistic interventions have no place in a free
society, the fact is that we accept paternalism in a variety of
contexts, from mandatory seatbelt and helmet laws 288 to laws
limiting access to unproven drugs.289 Such interventions can be
ed., 1992).
286. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L.
REV. 519, 522 (1988) ("At the core of every definition,... and surely indispen-
sable to the concept [of paternalism], is the notion that for an action of A to be
paternalist with respect to B (an individual or group), it must be taken in or-
der to benefit B."); ANTHONY KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACT LAW 254 (1979) (arguing that a restriction on consent is pater-
nalistic "if the sole justification for imposing it is to promote or protect the in-
dividual's own welfare (or happiness or good)").
287. Cf Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimenta-
tion and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 496 (1996) (arguing that
limitations on individual choice are not paternalistic if their goal is not to pro-
tect the individual "from disregarding his or her own interests" but instead is
to "increas[e] systemic efficiency or societal respect for human dignity"). Many
laws that interfere with individual choices can be justified by such nonpater-
nalistic goals. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conun-
drum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence,
99 HARv. L. REv. 330, 333 (1985) (defending prohibitions on slavery on the
ground that they promote the societal interest in "avoid[ing] the creation or
perpetuation of hierarchy in which some perennially dominate others").
288. See generally Ross D. Petty, The Impact of the Sport of Bicycle Riding
on Safety Law, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 185, 207-08 & n.118 (1998) (mandatory bicy-
cle helmet laws); David A. Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging
Safety Belt Defense, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 867, 868-89 (1986) (mandatory
seat belt laws).
289. See generally United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (up-
holding federal limitations on interstate shipment and sale of Laetrile).
Duncan Kennedy argues that paternalistic justifications underlie a broad
range of laws, including statutes protecting investors, insurers, consumers,
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justified when there are substantial reasons to believe that in-
dividuals will make decisions without taking their long-term
interests into account.290 As discussed above, this is likely to be
the case when individuals embark on infertility treatment,
given the difficulty of predicting how one will feel about any
frozen embryos that remain once treatment is complete.
291
Recognizing the difficulty of making such predictions does not
imply that infertility patients are somehow less capable than
other people to know their own selves. The inability to predict
one's future reaction to profoundly emotional experiences is a
common and understandable fact of life. Rather than repre-
senting a weakness, this inability affirms "a positive and dy-
namic part of our humanness"-the "capacity for growth and an
openness to experience in our relationships with others."292
Finally, the paternalism challenge to inalienability ignores
the fact that the contractual approach is subject to a similar
charge. Enforcing prior disposition agreements over a person's
contemporaneous objection is itself paternalistic because it
overrides the person's current wishes in order to protect the in-
terests of the person she was when the agreement was made.
In essence, the contractual approach asks the law to enforce a
system of "self-paternalism," in which individuals' current
wishes are disregarded to protect the wishes of the persons
they were in the past.293
It might be argued that enforcing a person's prior decisions
cannot constitute paternalism because the decision that is en-
forced was originally the person's own. As argued above, how-
ever, this argument makes sense only if one assumes that an
and tenants and common-law principles of contract and tort. See Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power,
41 Mn. L. REV. 563, 590-95, 624-38 (1982).
290. See Kennedy, supra note 289, at 634-35 (discussing cases where "the
courts refuse to enforce an agreement because one party has made a mistake
about his true interests that threatens to impoverish him"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1141-42
(1986) (arguing that limitations on private preferences can be justified when
they seek to overcome barriers to individuals' ability to promote their long-
term interests).
291. See supra Part IV.B.2.
292. SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 192, at 125.
293. See Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited, supra note 196, at 1945 (arguing
that the debate about inalienable rights "must abandon anti-paternalism, be-
cause the structure of rights requires the imposition of undesired goals on ei-
ther present or future selves").
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individual's prior decision remains "hers" even if it is antitheti-
cal to her current wishes, values, and beliefs. 294 Indeed, it is
arguable that judicial enforcement of self-paternalism actually
imposes more of a burden than other forms of paternalism be-
cause, in addition to having her authority to make particular
decisions taken away, the individual may feel remorse or guilt
for the prior decision that is being enforced.295
C. RELIANCE
A third possible objection to allowing individuals to change
their minds about decisions concerning the disposition of frozen
embryos is that such an approach ignores the interests of the
partner who has acted in reliance on a disposition decision
agreed to in advance. For example, a woman might argue that
she would not have undergone ovarian stimulation and egg re-
trieval if she knew that she would not be able to use all of the
embryos created because of her husband's objection at a later
date. Alternatively, she might claim that, had she known of
her partner's objection to the use of the remaining frozen em-
bryos earlier, she would have undergone an additional IVF cy-
cle at that time using donor sperm. If she is no longer able to
produce eggs, her reliance on the availability of the remaining
frozen embryos may leave her without any opportunity to have
genetically-related offspring of her own.
The problem with the reliance argument, however, is that
the law protects reliance only if it is "reasonable" to rely on a
commitment in a particular case.296 If it were clear that deci-
sions about the future disposition of frozen embryos were not
enforceable, it would no longer be reasonable to rely on the en-
294. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Drawing on the writings
of John Stuart Mill, Rebecca Dresser asks "whether the self is so unitary that
we may dispense with the concerns raised by true paternalistic intervention
merely because actual consent was given at one time." Rebecca S. Dresser,
Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the Voluntary
Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 777, 792 (1982) (discussing
appropriateness of enforcing advance consent to psychiatric treatment over
the patient's contemporaneous objection); see also DONALD VANDEVEER,
PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 49-58 (1986) (arguing that actions are pater-
nalistic if they conflict with the subject's preferences at the time of the action,
although concluding that prior consent can justify paternalism in some cases).
295. See Kronman, supra note 180, at 782 (arguing that, in some cases, de-
nying individuals the right to change their mind may "weaken[] a person's
confidence in his ability to make lasting commitments and guard the things he
cares for, and this, in turns, strikes at his self-respect").
296. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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forceability of disposition decisions made in advance. To en-
sure that people do not mistakenly rely on advance disposition
agreements, IVF programs could be required to notify couples
of their right to change their minds about disposition decisions
as part of the process of obtaining informed consent to IV.
The reliance argument also implies that the interests of
the partner who wants the original agreement enforced are
equivalent to, and perhaps greater than, those of the partner
who has subsequently changed her mind. As discussed in Part
III, however, using, donating, or destroying an embryo over the
objection of one of the partners will impose greater burdens on
that person than keeping the embryo frozen will impose on the
partner whose preferred disposition option is not carried out.297
In fact, in light of the centrality of inalienable rights to
those who hold them, it is usually the case that the rights-
holder's interest in changing her mind will outweigh the claims
of those who may be frustrated if a promise to relinquish an in-
alienable right is not kept. For example, the interests of a birth
mother in retaining a relationship with a child she has carried
in her womb will generally outweigh those of prospective adop-
tive parents in establishing a relationship with a child to whom
they have no pre-existing bond. Because the party seeking to
change her mind has more at stake, appeals to the reliance in-
terests of the party who seeks to enforce the original agreement
are less persuasive.
D. ANALOGY TO ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Supporters of the contractual approach to decisions about
the disposition of frozen embryos compare the approach to
other situations in which the law encourages people to plan in
advance. John Robertson, for example, argues that advance
disposition agreements are comparable to living wills and or-
gan donor cards.298
The analogy to living wills and other advance directives,
however, misses an important point. Advance directives enable
individuals to direct the course of their medical treatment after
they lose the capacity to make decisions directly. Their purpose
is not to limit the individual's ability to change her mind in the
future but to ensure that her wishes will be respected if she no
297. See supra Part III.
298. See Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 99, at 415 n.28.
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longer has the capacity to assert those wishes herself.299 In
fact, many statutes authorizing advance directives expressly
protect the individual's right to rescind the directive as long as
she retains decision-making capacity.3°° Because the contrac-
tual approach to decisions about the disposition of frozen em-
bryos is designed to limit the individual's future decision-
making authority, not to protect her wishes in the event she is
no longer able to assert them herself, the analogy to advance
directives does not apply.
Moreover, some commentators-including John Robert-
son-have argued that, even after a loss of decision-making ca-
pacity, treatment decisions expressed in an advance directive
should not necessarily be applied. In an article co-authored
with Rebecca Dresser, Robertson emphasizes that enforcing an
individual's prior directives about medical treatment may in-
sufficiently protect the current interests of the incapacitated
patient. "Because interests change over time and the person
executing the directive may not be assessing the situation from
the perspective of the future incompetent patient," Dresser and
Robertson argue, the assumption that enforcing the advance
directive will promote the patient's interests may not always be
correct.301 If it is inappropriate to enforce an advance directive
over the objection of a patient who lacks decision-making ca-
pacity, it is even less appropriate to enforce a prior disposition
decision over the objection of a person whose mental capacity is
not in doubt.
E. PRACTICALITY
One of the principal arguments raised in support of the
contractual approach is that enforcing advance disposition
agreements is the only way to provide the "certainty needed for
299. See generally Annas, supra note 102, at 1210-13 (explaining how ad-
vance directives have evolved and may be implemented).
300. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2985(1)(a) (McKinney 1993) ("A
competent adult may revoke a health care proxy by notifying the agent or a
health care provider orally or in writing or by any other act evidencing a spe-
cific intent to revoke the proxy.").
301. Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-
Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Ap-
proach, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH 234, 236-38 (1989); see also Rebecca Dresser,
Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 32, 34 (1995) (criticizing the position that an individ-
ual's prior directives should take precedence over her current interests).
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effective operation of IVF programs."302 The assumption seems
to be that allowing either partner to rescind an advance dispo-
sition agreement would invite disagreement and, as a result,
litigation. Without the advance disposition agreement to fall
back on, the fear is that there will be no way to determine how
the embryos should be disposed.
Actually, as Part V shows, an inalienable rights approach
to disposition decisions can provide equally certain rules for
practitioners, patients, and the courts. Unless the facility re-
ceives actual notice of an objection by one of the partners, it
could rely on the couple's disposition decisions expressed in ad-
vance. If one of the partners has changed her mind and the
couple cannot agree to a second-best disposition option, the de-
fault rule is clear: the embryos simply remain in frozen storage
until an agreement is reached, the embryos are no longer vi-
able, or the facility's agreed-upon storage limit expires.
If anything, the approach proposed here would be simpler
to administer than one that relies on advance disposition
agreements. Unlike the contractual approach, there would be
no need to resolve disputes over the validity or interpretation of
the couple's prior agreement.
CONCLUSION
As the use of ARTs becomes more prevalent, disputes over
the disposition of frozen embryos will inevitably arise. Al-
though it may be tempting to apply familiar principles of con-
tract law to such situations, courts and legislators should be
wary of that approach. As argued above, a central aspect of
procreative liberty is the right to make contemporaneous
choices about how one's reproductive capacity will be used. The
contractual approach to decisions about the disposition of fro-
zen embryos violates that principle and undermines important
societal values about reproduction, family relationships, and
the strength of genetic ties.
In place of the contractual approach, the law should re-
quire the couple's mutual consent before any affirmative dispo-
sition of a frozen embryo is enforced. While such consent could
be provided before the embryos are created, both partners
should retain the right to change their minds until a disposi-
tion decision is actually carried out. This inalienable rights
approach will protect the couple's interest in making contempo-
302. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
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raneous reproductive decisions and promote the important so-
cietal interests at stake. Furthermore, it will provide clear and
easily-administered rules for practitioners, patients, and the
courts.

